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Executive summary 
Ukraine is one of the few countries in the world that is in a position to significantly increase grain 
net exports, due to its strategic location and agro-ecological potential of its soils. Unleashing its 
potential would allow Ukraine not only to secure its own production and economic development of 
the country, but also to contribute to global food security.  
The main objectives of this study is i) to understand the potential of Ukraine to increase grain 
production and export and ii) to explore the current state of institutional reform that is needed for 
unleashing Ukraine's production and export potential. 
Global food security is one of the main concerns of many policy makers and international 
organizations due to population increase and limited resources available worldwide. Ukraine could 
contribute to global food security by increasing its own grain production and expanding grain 
exports. However, to realize both of these targets, good institutional settings need to be put in place 
to protect interest of investors as well as of the local population. 
The grain production potential of Ukraine depends on the two main factors: land area cultivated and 
yield. The share of land under grain production is very high in Ukraine, however shows a rather 
unstable character, growing or falling from year to year. Besides changes due to extreme weather 
conditions, the strong fluctuations across years relate to unsustainable mid- and long-term state 
policy in grain production, lack of control for crop rotation and other environmental measures, 
absence of crop insurance system. In terms of yields, Ukrainian grain yields look poor and are below 
the corresponding worldwide averages for the last decade, despite the fact that environmental 
conditions in Ukraine are above average. The average yield ratio for grain crops shows that there is 
10% to 40% gap between the actual and potential yield that could be achieved given the soils and 
agro-climatic conditions in Ukraine. 
The rapid emergency, in the last decade, of large intensive agricultural enterprises and agro-
holdings, which currently dominate in the agricultural sector of Ukraine, and as a rule are efficient 
business projects (with easy access to capital, markets, policy facilitation and innovation), 
contribute positively to agricultural sector growth in Ukraine. However, the induced intensification 
of agricultural production resulted in adverse consequences and has not resulted in overall rural 
development. It also worsens environmental quality through high fertilization rates and absence of 
necessary crop rotations. Without adequate regulations, these trends may lead to further land 
degradation, loss of fertile soils, water, air and soil pollution.  
Effectiveness of large-scale production is being widely promoted by policy makers over the last 
couple of years, at the same time claiming that small and medium producers are ineffective in 
farming. But if we look into statistics it is not always the case. Even though areas and yields are 
important factors to measure increase in grain production, operational efficiencies are important as 
well. In terms of efficiency, there is a significant difference between large agricultural enterprises 
and peasant farms. The assessment of productivity in monetary terms illustrates that for corn and 
industrial crops net revenues per ton are higher in case of agricultural enterprises, while for wheat 
and livestock products (except milk) net revenue is significantly higher for peasant farms.  
The main challenges for increasing grain exports from Ukraine relate to infrastructure, export 
restrictions and customs regulations. The logistics and trade infrastructure should be improved not 
only to cope with higher production in Ukraine but also with transit of grain from other countries 
such as Russia and Kazakhstan. Increase of grain exports is impossible without improving 
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Ukraine’s infrastructure, but also without removing current barriers for free and timely export of 
grain from Ukraine. Improved infrastructure and transparency in grain export market could reduce 
transportation and marketing costs, increase competition and attract further investment into 
agribusiness. In addition, it could generate higher farm gate prices for grain producers. 
Several studies argue that Ukraine’s failure to tap its full production and export potential is mainly a 
result of its market-unfriendly institutional base. According to the 2013 Index of Economic 
Freedom Ukraine is scoring 161 out of 177 countries, with scores well below the European average 
in property rights, freedom from corruption, fiscal freedom, government spending, business 
freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial 
freedom. Even though there is a significant support from the EU and other international 
organizations there is still a lot of work to be done to develop an adequate institutional framework. 
The necessary measures to support grain market liberalization include clearly defined property 
rights, enforcement of contracts, credit access, and better market infrastructure.  
In terms of the National Program for Rural Development until 2015 the government shall improve 
coordination between central and local authorities on program implementation, improve monitoring 
and provide sufficient financing to cover all important measures of the Program. According to the 
2012 report of Accounting Chamber of Ukraine there was no financing provided for construction of 
social infrastructure, support for development of depressed areas, funding for protection, restoration 
and improvement of soil fertility as well as other measures of the Program. The critical situation in 
agriculture has also been confirmed by the audit of the State Program of Technical Assistance to 
Agriculture until 2015 which observed continued decrease in the numbers of agricultural equipment, 
including tractors and combine harvesters. 
Ukraine participates in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) framework, which aims at 
deepening the relationship between the EU and its neighbours. Ukraine has started negotiations with 
the EU on the establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which shall 
go further than classic free trade areas, as it will both open up markets but also address 
competitiveness issues and the steps needed to meet EU standards. The DCFTA is basically 
designed to deepen Ukraine's access to the European market and to encourage further European 
investment in Ukraine. 
Achieving Ukraine's ambitious but still realistic plans of production improvement and export 
increase, and establishment of a good base for agricultural development in Ukraine will only be 
possible in case of supportive policy making. Policy should move to the following directions: i) 
support to increase of overall farm productivity with more attention given to farm sustainability 
from the environmental point of view (i.e. protection of soils, air and water); and ii) assistance in 
reduction of excessive market transaction costs from the farm gate to the markets with more 
financial and technical support provided to small farmers iii) creation of an open grain market 
without export restrictions and the monopoly position of grain exporters. In terms of transport 
infrastructure (i.e. railways and roads) and storage facilities the state shall be able to attracting 
foreign direct investments into such projects by improving the rule of law (e.g. protection of 
property rights and fight against corruption) as well as creation of open grain market. 
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1. Introduction 
Ukraine is the largest European country (after Russia) of around 60,3 mln. ha and covering 5,7 % of 
the total land area of Europe. It has key location between the EU and Russia and access to the Black 
Sea. In the Ukrainian economy agricultural sector has always played an important role both during 
the Soviet era as well as after becoming independent in 1991. Agriculture contributes significantly 
to the employment (15% of economically active population
1
) and GDP (8% of Gross Value Added 
in 2010) and has a pivotal role in foreign trade
2
. In the last 10 years Ukraine gained considerable 
share of international agro-food markets as exporter of grains, rapeseed, sunflower oil and seeds. 
Ukraine's natural resources provide great opportunities for expanding agricultural production. 
Almost 69% (or 41,6 mln. ha) of total available land in Ukraine is classified as agriculture land, 
which makes the share of arable land to be about 78%, which is significantly higher than for many 
developed countries. Due to its fertile soils (25% of all rich black earth soil in the world
3
) Ukraine 
has a significant agricultural potential, which has yet to be unleashed (Deininger et al. 2011). 
Therefore, Ukraine is one of the few countries in the world that is in a position to significantly 
increase grain net exports. The main question underlying this study is therefore how Ukraine 
farming sector can unleash its potential in order to contribute to the economic development of the 
country and global food security through improvement of its institutional arrangements and 
practices. 
Ukraine, since its independence went through a transformation process with several changes. Even 
though most Eastern European countries faced challenges, Ukraine had specific problems derived 
from its relationship with Russia and also with the critical economic situation and the financial 
crisis (Hagemann 2012)4. Ukraine´s governmental system still has some remains of the former 
Soviet regime, which has been subject to stepwise revision (D´Anieri et al., 1999)5. Development of 
the Ukrainian economy took more time compared to the other post-Soviet countries in Europe, and 
its GDP started to grow only from 2000
6
. Despite of the internal problems Ukraine aims to establish 
stronger ties with the EU and tries to improve its standards. This effort has been confirmed by 
bilateral agreements with the EU, including Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1998, 
European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP) Action Plan of 2005 and National Indicative 
Programme for 2011-2013, where the institutional reforms are included together with the support to 
development of the agro-industry sector and to trade facilitation. As a consequence, several new 
institutions and governance structures had been established. However, until today among others the 
                                                     
1 The official data in this section are from the 2010 Statistical Yearbook of Ukraine, issued by SSSU, the State Statistics Service of 
Ukraine. Other data on Ukraine, when not explicitly referenced to, are also from the SSSU. Most of its statistical tables are 
available in English from its website via http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/ 
2 Ukraine’s main trading partner in agricultural production is the EU, both in terms of imports and exports 
EC-DG-Agri 2009 Agriculture & Rural Development: Agricultural Trade Policy Analysis unit: The Agricultural Sector and Trade in 
Ukraine, July 2009. Accessed 10 September 2012: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/map/03_09_fullreport.pdf 
3  United Nation 2007 Environmental Performance Reviews: Ukraine. Second Review (p12)   Accessed 15 September 2012: 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/epr/epr_studies/Ukraine%20II.pdf  
4 Hagemann, N. 2012. Institutional obstacles for the implementation of a River Basin Management concept in Western Ukraine. 
Helmholtz-Zentrum für Umweltforschung GmbH  (UFZ ) Discussion Paper. Accessed 20 June 2013 
http://www.ufz.de/export/data/global/38006_11%202012%20Hagemann_Water%20policy%20submission_Gesamt_internet.pdf 
5 D´Anieri, P.J., Kravchuk, R., & Kuzio, T. 1999. Politics and society in Ukraine. Boulder et al., Westview Press.  
6
 World Bank data: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG; Accessed 20 June 2013 
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supportive trade practices and institutional settings to support the increasing grain supply are still 
not completely developed. 
Based on the purpose of the study, Chapter 2 assesses the grain production and export potential of 
Ukraine and major limitations, Chapter 3 analyses current state of institutional reform focusing on 
the major constraints and challenges related to supply of grain production to the world market. 
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2. Grain potential of Ukraine and major limitations 
Agriculture in Ukraine is an important sector of the national economy and plays a crucial role in 
rural life and national food security.  Many recent studies (ACC EBA 2011, Heyest 2009, IERPC 
2008) show that it could contribute much more to the economic growth in Ukraine and provide 
much better supply to the world food market. Ukraine’s unique agricultural potential (its soils) are 
discussed in several studies (Borodina 2012, IAASTD 2009, Keyzer et al. 2012.), at the same time, 
the use of this resource claimed to be extremely inefficient and not safe in terms of environment and 
water protection. The impact of the Ukrainian agricultural production system on the environment is 
estimated to cause 35-40 percent of the total environmental degradation including soil erosion and 
degradation, loss of biodiversity, water contamination, mismanaged agricultural waste, soil 
contamination, and inadequate storage of obsolete pesticides (Stefanovska and Pidlisnyuk 2002, 
World Bank 2007). 20 years after Independence in 1991, the striking thing about Ukrainian 
agriculture is no longer its outstanding potential but rather the fact that this potential continues to be 
wasted as a result of misguided policies (ACC EBA 2011). Before describing in details the main 
constraints unleashing Ukraine's production potential, first the state of its grain production and 
export potential are explored in the next subchapters 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. 
2.1. Grain production potential 
Ukraine is one of the few countries in the world that are in a position to significantly increase grain 
production, since Ukraine's soils agri-ecological potential has not yet been fully exploited. The aim 
here is to explore to what extent the grain production can be increased and to understand what type 
of farms could provide this production in order to fulfil the national food demand and produce 
surplus for export in order to contribute to global food security. 
The grain production potential of Ukraine depends on two main factors: land area cultivated and 
yield. Below an overview is given on these two factors, first at macro level or national level, and 
then at micro level to reflect the current dual farming system in Ukraine. 
 
2.1.1. Land under grain 
Land use issues remain very important for agricultural production and its sustainability in the long 
run. The share of land under grain production is very high in Ukraine, despite the fact that the trend 
is decreasing. In 1950 more than 20 mln ha of land in Ukraine were under grains, thus it has 
decreased by 25% (to 15 mln ha) in the last half century. Error! Reference source not found. 
shows trends since 1980. A declining trend is visible starting from year 1988, which has been 
followed by a rapid increase in 2001 and relative stabilization until 2010. A rapid increase in 2001 
was a result of adoption of the State Program "Grain of Ukraine-2001" with a main focus on 
increase grain production in Ukraine. The Program envisaged state support of "effective" grain 
production, allocation of more land under grains, development of so-called technological production 
cards to increase the productivity of grains, etc. Such policy initiative, supported by state funding 
been gladly accepted by big industrial business entities and then the production significantly 
increased7.  
 
                                                     
7
 Order of the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food  #159/78 from 27.08.2000 (full text http://ua-
info.biz/legal/baseap/ua-zmtgvt/str4.htm) 
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Figure 1. Land under grain production in Ukraine  
 
 Source: Data from State Statistical Committee of Ukraine  
It can also be seen, that land area under grains if fluctuating by millions of hectares from year to 
year. For example, a strong decrease in land in 2003 has been caused by extremely unfavorable 
weather conditions in the previous year. As a result of great crop losses in 2002, many producers 
lost money and had to decrease sown areas under grains in the following year. In turn, such situation 
led to significant deficit on internal grain market in 2003-2004 marketing year and influenced 
domestic food prices significantly, especially for livestock products (due to high feeding costs). 
Besides changes due to extreme weather conditions, the strong fluctuations across the years are 
related to the unsustainable mid- and long-term state policy in grain production, lack of control for 
crop rotation and absence of crop insurance system (Von Cramon-Taubadel et al. 2001). 
Figure 2. Land under wheat, barley and corn production in Ukraine 
 
Source: Data from State Statistical Committee of Ukraine 
The recent situation of land use for grain production is presented on Figure 2 for major grain crops, 
such as wheat, barley and corn. It can be seen that in terms of land area wheat is occupying around 
the half of the grain area and the rest is divided between barley and corn. While the wheat area had 
dropped considerably after the Independence (in 1990 wheat was produced on 7557.7 thousand ha 
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and in 2000 – on 6284.1 thousand ha, thus production area decreased by 17%)8, it has increased 
again in the last decade close to its original size from 1990 though it is still smaller. Barley 
production increased after the 1990s, though corn is the one showing a strong increasing tendency 
within grain crops in the last decade. As of 2010 around 35% (~15 mln ha) of the agricultural land 
area was under grain production, the rest was occupied by around 16% oilseeds, 6% fodder crops, 
19% permanent grassland and 16% bare fallow, the remaining 8% constitute of permanent crops, 
potatoes, vegetables, sugar beet and protein crops
9
.  
According to M. A. Keyzer et al. 2012, around 13 mln ha of arable land would need to be removed 
from production: 3 mln ha due to degradation10  and 10 mln ha would need to be converted into 
natural grasslands and reforestation11. This means that the total arable land area of 32.5 mln ha 
would need to be reduced considerably (by 1/3rd) to 19.3 mln ha, for sustainability concerns. This 
would have consequences on the land use and also on the potential grain production of Ukraine. In 
terms of sustainability and environmental safety removing of land would be a step forward, at the 
same time it may influence potential production in case modern technologies and approaches in 
crop production will not be applied.   
 
2.1.2. Grain yields 
Figure 3: Ratio of actual over potential yield of grain crops in Ukraine 
 
Source: GAEZ v3.0., IIASA & FAO 2010 http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at 
Current and attainable yields, the yield gaps, provide important information for identifying causes 
and addressing rural poverty and food insecurity issues. Based on the IIASA & FAO study12, yield 
gaps have been estimated (in GAEZ v3.0) by comparing potential attainable yields and actual yields 
from downscaling year 2000 statistics of main food and fiber crops (statistics derived mainly from 
                                                     
8
 Crop production of Ukraine: Bulletin of State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2011, p.60 
9
 Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine 
10 Project of Law on National program of land use and protection. Available at: 
http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb_n/webproc4_2?id=&pf3516=5755&skl=5 
11 Collection of scientific papers of the National Research Center “Institute for Agriculture by the National Academy of Agrarian 
Sciences of Ukraine” - K.: "EKSMO" Press, 2010. – Issue 3. – P.6. 
12 IIASA/FAO, 2012. Global Agro‐ecological Zones (GAEZ v3.0). IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria and FAO, Rome, Italy Accessed 3 
May 2013 http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/gaez/docs/GAEZ_Model_Documentation.pdf 
IIASA 2012. Land Use Change and Agriculture Program, Accessed 3 May 2013  
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/modelsData/LandUseMetaData.pdf 
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FAOSTAT and the FAO study AT 2010/30). The average yield ratio for grain crops can be seen in 
Figure 3. It shows that there is more than 10% up to 40% yield gap between the actual and potential 
yield that could be achieved given the soils and agro-climatic conditions in Ukraine. By observing 
the yield gap for wheat crop it can be seen that the difference of actual and potential yield ranges 
between 25% and 40% (Figure 4 below).  
Figure 4: Ratio of actual over potential yield of rained and irrigated wheat in Ukraine (2000 vs. 2020) 
 
Source: GAEZ v3.0., IIASA & FAO 2010 http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at 
The agro-climatically attainable yields
13 
 with projection to 2020 can differ for each crop type 
depending on the level of input intensity (see Annex 5: Agro-climatically attainable yield for grain 
crops). For wheat the yields would range from 2.75 t/ha (low input) up to 10 t/ha (high input), for 
barley showing a very similar picture. For corn it would range from 4.45 t/ha (low input) to 12.25 
t/ha (high input). These higher yields with rain-fed production could be attained especially in the 
Western region, however with irrigation these yields could be reached also in the South-Eastern 
region, which is more arid compared to the Western part of the country. 
Figure 5. Yields of major grains in Ukraine compared with the world average (2000-2009) 
Source: American Chamber of Commerce, European Business Association in Ukraine.  
                                                     
13
 Agro-climatic yields are calculated for individual land utilization types for prevailing temperature and radiation regimes 
using the GAEZ eco-physiological model. Results account for temperature and moisture constraints that are affecting 
growth and development and yield reducing effects caused by pests, diseases and weeds as well as climate related 
workability constraints. Estimated yields are referred to as agro-climatically attainable yields. (IIASA & FAO 2010) 
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Ukrainian grain yields in international comparisons look also poor. Figure 5 shows that in most 
cases the yields of major crops in Ukraine are below the corresponding worldwide averages for the 
last decade, despite the fact that environmental conditions in Ukraine are above average. Only in 
case of wheat there is some indication that Ukrainian yields are catching up to world levels (ACC 
EBA 2011). 
According to the estimation of American Chamber of Commerce and European Business 
Association, if Ukraine had been able to achieve at least world average yields in each year for all 
main grain crops mentioned in Figure 5, it would have given additional production of around 33.8 
mln tons of grain over the decade of 2000-2009. Comparing Ukraine to a neighbour country of 
Poland, with similar climate and economic condition (ACC EBA 2011), over the last decade, yields 
of major grains in Ukraine were on average just over 70% of corresponding yields in Poland. Thus, 
if in Ukraine had been achieved at least same average yields level as in Poland, it would increase 
production by almost 130 mln tons of grain over the decade. If we look at the fact that the potential 
yields could reach even higher level (e.g. 7 ton/ha or in some areas up to 10 t/ha instead of the 
current 3 tons/ha for wheat, Keyzer et al. 2012, IIASA &FAO 2010), than it would mean even 
higher productivity increase, though it would require capital investments in crop production e.g. 
improving/acquiring fixed assets as well as improving liquidity to cover additional input costs. To 
achieve such a high yield supportive policy measures would be needed. Figure 6 shows growing 
dynamics of Ukrainian average grain yields in the past, before the independence and current figures 
on the right. It should be noted though, that recent comparison of data by types of producers is 
available for 2010 only, while disaggregated data of yields by crops (wheat, barley, corn) for more 
recent periods 1990-2011 is available and presented in  
Figure 7. 
Figure 6. Average grain yields (wheat, barley, rye) in Ukraine (1980-1990, 2010) 
  
Source: calculated based on data from State Statistical Committee 
 
As it can be seen in Figure 6, 2010 average yield for all types of producers was at least 20% lower 
than average yield for the last five years of the Soviet times. At the same time, effectiveness of grain 
production in household plots (small and medium producers) is 10% lower and in case of peasant 
farms is 20% lower compared to the domestic corporate producers. As we can see, productivity is 
low for all types of producers and comparing to the average wheat yield of the EU 27 in 2011 
Ukraine made only 62.6% of EU yield levels, while for barley and corn 57.3% and 85.1%, 
respectively (JRC 2012).  
2010 
Average yield of 
grain (enterprises)  
2, 76 tons per ha 
Average yield of 
grain (household 
plots)  
2, 50 tons per ha 
Average yield of 
grain (peasant 
farms)  
 2, 19 tons per ha 
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Figure 7. Average yields by type of grain crops (1990-2011) 
 
Source: State Statistical Service of Ukraine 
2.2. Duality in production and production efficiency  
2.2.1. Duality in production 
In the early 1990s the agricultural sector of Ukraine started a process of dualisation, which is still 
ongoing, dividing the primary sector into two main groups of producers: large agricultural 
enterprises and small and medium sized individual farms, i.e. peasant farms (farmers) and 
household plots (households) (Keyzer et al. 2012). Agricultural enterprises in Ukraine are being 
actively restructured and integrated, forming large agro-holdings. During 2005 and 2006 the number 
of enterprises, which operate more than 10 thousand hectares of land, has increased by 27%; the 
average size of the total area in these enterprises has increased by 7% to more than 20 thousand 
hectares (Borodina 2009).  
Agro-holdings concentrate primarily on intensive profitable production such as cash crops for 
export and raw-materials for biofuels, which increases socio-economic and environmental risks in 
rural areas. As a consequence the decreasing production diversity and diversion of land and water 
resources from direct food production undermines food security. It also worsens environmental 
quality through high fertilization rates and absence of necessary crop rotations
14
. Without adequate 
regulations, these trends may lead to further land degradation, loss of fertile soils, water, air and soil 
pollution.  
Small and medium production by household plots and peasant farmers is usually more sustainable 
and environmental-friendly (Prokopa & Berkuta 2011). In terms of crop production smallholders 
usually produce wheat, rye and barley. In most cases low quality crops used as fodder and some 
produced crops of better quality are supplied to large traders. In addition, as small and medium 
producers usually live within their production area, they perform environment-friendly production, 
saving water, air and land resources. 
Effectiveness of large-scale production is being widely promoted by policy makers over the last 
couple of years, at the same time claiming that small and medium producers are ineffective in 
                                                     
14
 Information on legal norms of crop rotations can be found at:  http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/164-2010-
%D0%BF 
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farming. Strong support of large producers by the government was mostly justified by their extreme 
production effectiveness. But if we look into statistics it is not always the case.       
In spite of domestic unfavorable conditions (such as high interest rates, tangled taxation, 
government pressure), small and medium producers keep surviving and producing, playing and 
important role in the national food security. Main assets of households are time and own labor, 
which helps them to survive. Households existed historically, survived through Soviet times and 
motivation for conducting household production is still in place, despite the fact that it is weaker 
than in the Soviet Union. 
 
2.2.2. Production efficiency 
Even though areas and yields are important factors to measure increase in grain production, 
operational efficiencies are important as well as they can make grain production unprofitable. In 
terms of efficiency, there is a significant difference between farm types (large agricultural 
enterprises, and peasant farms / household plots). The assessment of productivity in monetary terms 
is shown in Table 1. It illustrates that for corn and the industrial crops the gross margins (net 
revenue) per ton are higher in case of agricultural enterprises compared to peasant farms, except for 
wheat where average net revenue is significantly higher for peasant farms. This is the case for 
livestock products (except milk) as well, particularly due to lower input costs.  
 
Table 1. Average revenues and cost per 1dct (100 kg) by farm type and by commodity, UAH (2010)* 
Agricultural 
products 
Enterprises Peasant farms 
Average 
gross 
revenues  
Average 
input costs  
Average net 
revenue 
Average 
gross 
revenues  
Average 
input costs  
Average net 
revenue 
Wheat 109,12 99,60 9,52 105,19 88,31 16,88 
Corn 124,20 95,65 28,55 113,23 89,94 23,29 
Sunflower 302,80 183,88 118,92 282,52 190,29 92,23 
Sugar beet  48,73 41,76 6,97 32,58 29,34 3,24 
Potato 225,30 138,97 86,33 247,19 185,85 61,35 
Beef and veal  896,08 1397,24 -501,16 996,01 1028,83 -32,82 
Pork 1220,40 1323,69 -103,29 1287,88 1325,44 -37,57 
Poultry 989,29 1034,37 -45,08 1017,49 948,96 68,53 
Milk 269,81 228,94 40,87 250,43 222,16 28,26 
Source: State Statistical Service of Ukraine  
* 1 dct = 100 kilograms; gross revenues is production valued at farm-gate price; input costs cover current inputs 
including own produced feed, and a remuneration of labor.    
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The difference between the two farm types in terms of efficiency is also illustrated in Figure 8, 
which is measured as a proportion of gross revenue and input costs of each product group seen in 
Table 1.  
Figure 8. Efficiency of agricultural enterprises and peasant farms 
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Note: Calculations based on Table 1 above, Source: State Statistical Service of Ukraine 
According to estimations of USDA, constant lack of modern equipment remains one of Ukraine’s 
main obstacles to increase grain production and quality.  In late 1980's Ukrainian winter wheat 
harvest could be finished in roughly three weeks, while nowadays the same process takes twice as 
long to complete, and both yield and grain quality suffer as a result of these delays.  USDA 
estimated that 10 to 20 percent of the standing crop is typically lost due to outdated, inefficient 
machinery. While custom combining is available, operators charge 20 to 25 percent of the crop in 
exchange for their services.   
Table 2 shows availability of technical resources in households, but in spite of good numbers it 
should be taken into account that most of that machinery is old, left from Soviet times and requires 
modernization. Also, land and crops cultivated with such old machinery are not in compliance with 
good agronomy practices and of course, fuel consumption of those machines is enormous. At the 
same time as of 2010, over 86.6% of enterprises have tractors, 87,7% have seeders, 86.4% of 
enterprises have combines
15
.  
 Table 2. Availability of equipment in rural households in 2011 
 Total households, 
% 
Including households with land area 
0.5 ha or less 0.51-1.00 ha 1.01 ha and more 
Households, which use:     
                                                     
15
 Data according to State Statistical Committee of Ukraine “Agriculture of Ukraine-2011” 
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Combine 1.7 0 0.4 3.9 
Tractor 16.5 4.3 10.2 29.9 
Seeder 11.9 2.3 12 19.3 
Cultivator 13.5 5 10.1 22.1 
Plough 39.4 15.4 40.2 57.9 
Truck 2.9 0.8 1.3 5.5 
Source: State Statistical Committee, 2011   
2.3. Grain export potential 
After fulfilling its domestic consumption requirements, Ukraine has a grain production surplus to 
provide to the world market which is illustrated in Figure 9 and Figure 10. It can be seen that since 
2000 export of Ukrainian grain is increasing especially for wheat, corn and barley crop commodities 
(the main export destinations are illustrated in Annex 6). The total amount of grain crops exported 
constitutes to 25% of the total agricultural exports of the country and plays an important role in the 
domestic economy. 
Figure 9. Total grain export of Ukraine by crop type (1000 tons) 
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Source USDA, 2012. 
Figure 10.  Grain export of Ukraine per main grain crop type separately (1000 tons) 
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Source USDA, 2012. 
The growing importance of Ukraine in world grain market can also be observed by looking at the 
proportion of grain contributed to the total world supply (Figure 11). The wheat, corn and barley 
from the Ukraine's grain crops have the most important contribution to the world market. Currently 
Ukraine contributes to the total world grain production by around 6%, and to the world export of 
grain by close to 15%, and the figures are expected to rise to 8% and 18% by 2020 respectively 
(Figure 11). Based on the most recent macroeconomic market models that have been developed and 
are dealing with future agricultural market projections [OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook (2011), 
EU AGLINK (2011) and AGMEMOD (2012)] the role of Ukraine in the world grain market is 
significant and is expected to increase in the future.  
Figure 11. Ukraine grain production and export: historical trend and projections (% of the world 
grain production and export)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EU AGLINK, 2011
16
 
According to the most recent AGMEMOD projections (Table 3) up to 2025 the grain area is 
expected to increase slightly, since some of the abandoned land is expected to get into production 
(van Leeuwen at al. 2012). Under assumption of normal weather conditions, steady trends for 
demand and yield and current policy environment, wheat exports are projected to reach around 13 
mln tons (with 3.7 t/ha yield), barley 5.3 mln tons (with 3.6 t/ha) and  maize 3.2 mln tons (with 6 
t/ha) in 2025. 
Table 3. Current state and projections in grain production, yield and land area used 
wheat barley maize total grain* wheat barley maize total grain* wheat barley maize total grain*
area (ha) 6300 4550 2100 12950 6713 4318 2453 13483 7 -5 17 4
yield (t/ha) 2.89 2.15 4.62 3.22 3.7 3.6 6.0 4.43 28 67 30 38
production (t) 18176 9760 9692 37628 25013 15741 14673 55426 38 61 51 47
domestic use (t) ** 12000 5400 6000 23400 12000 10494 11419 33912 0 94 90 45
domestic use (%) 66 55 62 62 48 67 78 61 -27 20 26 -2
net-export (t) 6176 4360 3692 14228 12965 5259 3220 21444 110 21 -13 51
net-export (%) 34 45 38 38 52 33 22 39 53 -25 -42 2
self-sufficiency 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.6 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.6 38 -17 -20 2
* excludes rye, oats and other grains
** food, feed seeds and losses
Current (2009-2010) Projections 2025 % change
 
Source: Own calculations based on State Statistical Service and AGMEMOD projections (van Leeuwen et al 2012)17 
                                                     
16
 The historical data and projections in EU AGLINK (2011) of grain production and export are illustrated as a 
percentage of the total grain production in the world. 
 
17
 The current figures (average of 2009-2010) for the area, yield, production, domestic use and net-export are based on 
State Statistical Service data. The projections to 2025 are based on the AGMEMOD calculations (van Leeuwen et al. 
2012). The percentage difference between projections and current state is based on own calculations. Self-sufficiency is 
calculated as a proportion of production and domestic use. 
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Despite that these projections do not reflect the maximum potential of Ukraine (i.e. assuming only 
slight yield increase up to 3.7 t/ha in 2025 instead of 7 t/ha), with the expected 12 mil. t/year of 
wheat for domestic use, even relatively low production increase on the level of around 38% of 
current production would make Ukraine an important supplier for international grain markets (i.e. 
double of the current wheat export level). This will also contribute to the welfare of the rural 
population.  
In order to increase this export production volume the main obstacles need to be identified and 
examined. While analyzing the historical data of grain production and export of Ukraine from 2000 
to 2011 (prior to 2000 export was very minor) it can be said that there is a significant difference in 
the variability
18
 between the grain production and export, equal to around 23% and 60% for 
production and export respectively (Figure 12). Since export variability exceeds production 
variability it means that the there are other external factors beyond the production uncertainty (e.g. 
due to weather conditions) that are impacting the total amount of grain export from Ukraine. If we 
split grain variability between wheat and coarse grain (other than wheat, e.g. barley and corn), it can 
be said that there is a higher variability in case of wheat compared to other coarse grains, since the 
former has 33% production and 72% export variability, while the coarse grain has 20% production 
and 55% export variability, though, the difference concerning uncertainty beyond production are 
quite similar (39% for wheat and 35% for coarse grain). 
Figure 12. Variability of grain production and export 
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Source: EU AGLINK 2011 
This indicates that based on the amount of grain production (taking into account the risks of extreme 
weather conditions) one cannot predict the export volumes, In other words, busting of production is 
not enough and the problems related to other factors influencing grain export should be explored. 
These factors are related to several issues, such as insufficient development of export infrastructure 
including grain storage and processing capacities
19
, lack of finance to invest in export logistics, 
challenges related to governance and institutional organization, administrative restrictions on grain 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
18
 Own calculations based on using the coefficient of variation of grain production and export.  
19
 Prior to 2000 the low export can be partly explained by insufficient elevator facilities and low transshipment capacity 
of the ports. 
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export, problem of VAT recovery for exporters and problems related to the quality of grain (FAO 
2012, USDA 2011; World Bank/OECD 2004).  
2.4. Grain transportation infrastructure  
Since Ukraine has one of the key east-west transport corridors between Asia and Europe, it gives 
Ukraine a good opportunity for involvement in the world trade as exporter/importer and also to play 
an important role as a transit country. Despite Ukraine's good location, there are several trade-
specific barriers
20 
that put a burden on current and potential exporters from Ukraine. One of the 
trade specific barriers is related to transport infrastructure (the quality, quantity and capacity of 
physical infrastructure i.e. roads, railways, rivers, ports), storage facilities and logistics.  
Figure 13. Logistics Performance Index of Ukraine in 2012 (1=low to 5=high) 
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Source: World Bank 2012
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According to the World Bank (2010b) Ukraine’s trade and transit potential is far from fully 
exploited (i.e. most export commodities have relatively low added processing value while 
manufactured goods are mainly designed for the Russian market), thus the quantity of goods traded 
from and transported through Ukraine can still be expanded. At the same time, there is a strong 
demand for transit routes in Ukraine due to increased transit volumes which appeared after the 
Soviet era. Unfortunately the transport infrastructure inherited from Soviet times is not able to 
support these increased volumes, thus infrastructure for all modes of transportation shall be 
modernised and integrated better with each other in order to allow Ukraine to compete with 
alternative east-west routes through the Baltic countries, Belarus and Poland, the Black Sea and the 
Balkans / Bosporus. 
Efficiently of the transport infrastructure can be measured using the Logistics Performance Index 
(LPI) developed by the World Bank
22
. According to 2012 LPI Ukraine was ranked 66
th
 out of 155 
countries (it was ranked 102
nd
 in 2010). This performance measurement includes a range of services 
                                                     
20
 In Ukraine trade specific barriers are mainly related to complicated regulatory and legal environment (e.g. lengthy 
customs procedures, instability in legislation, up-hock export restrictions), problem with standardisation, high level of 
corruption
20
, difficulties in obtaining refunds for VAT, and bottlenecks related to trade infrastructure and logistics (i.e. 
transport/storage infrastructure) (OECD 2012; World Bank 2010; World Bank 2005).  
21
 World Bank 2012: Connecting to Compete 2012 Trade Logistics in the Global Economy: The Logistics Performance 
Index and Its Indicators. Accessed 10 May 2013 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/TRADE/Resources/239070-
1336654966193/LPI_2012_final.pdf 
 
22
 Source: http://lpisurvey.worldbank.org/ Accessed 15 July 2012 
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and processes that are involved in moving goods from one country to another and grouped under six 
main categories: customs, infrastructure, international shipments, logistics competence, tracking and 
tracing, timeliness (Figure 13). Ukraine scores between 2.41-3.31 in all these categories (maximum 
score is 5), with the lowest scores received for customs and infrastructure, 2.41 and 2.69, 
respectively. Despite the fact that some improvements have been observed in the last 5 years, further 
improvements are needed in all of these aspects.  
According to the World Bank
23
, customs procedures in Ukraine are extremely inefficient, especially 
in terms of the clearance processes (i.e. speed, simplicity and predictability of the formalities). The 
current clearance time is around 2 days on average, and the average charge for a  40-foot dry 
container or a semi-trailer ranges between 866$ (662 Euros) (port and airport supply chain) and 
1061$ (811 Euro) (land supply chain), this including agent fees, port / airport, and other charges 
(World Bank 2012
24
). With improved customs operations and avoidance of grey payment schemes, 
indirect logistics costs for Ukraine could be reduced by $US5 billion per year, and direct logistics 
costs (such as freight) by $US1 billion. Ukraine’s total logistics costs for 2008 were estimated at 
$US23 billion, or 15.1% of total trade value, or 12.1% of GDP (The World Bank 2010).  
Bottlenecks in the supply chain may cause excessive transit times, which can lead to spoilage and 
delays in supply to people in need (World Bank/FAO 2012
25
). For example, transportation of grain 
within the territory of Ukraine requires six different permits and five more to ship it abroad
26
. Such 
practice results in significant delays that transform into losses across the entire logistical chain 
decreasing competitiveness of Ukrainian grain. Simplification of administrative procedures and 
improvement of grain logistics in this respect are extremely important in order to avoid huge losses 
caused by unnecessary delays.  
 
Figure 14. Grain transit through Ukraine (2006-2010) 
 
                                                     
23
 World Bank 2010: Ukraine: Trade and Facilitation Study; Accessed October 2012 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/UKRAINEEXTN/Resources/TTF_April2010.pdf 
24
 World Bank 2012: Connecting to Compete 2012 Trade Logistics in the Global Economy: The Logistics Performance 
Index and Its Indicators http://siteresources.worldbank.org/TRADE/Resources/239070-
1336654966193/LPI_2012_final.pdf 
25
 World Bank/ FAO 2012. The Grain Chain Food Security and Managing Wheat Imports in Arab Countries 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/tci/docs/The%20Grain%20Chain_ENG.pdf; Accessed 10 May 2013 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/TRADE/Resources/239070-1336654966193/LPI_2012_final.pdf 
26
 http://blog.chamber.ua/2012/11/ukraines-grain-market-development-what-are-the-further-steps/; Accessed 10 May 
2013 
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Source: www.blackseegrain.net
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Besides the current high level of production, the potential increase in grain production surpluses 
also need to be taken into account when analysing the state of the physical infrastructure for grain 
trade as well as potential increase of transit to Europe from countries such as Russia or Kazakhstan 
as was the case in 2006-2007 (Error! Reference source not found.. 
The transportation of grain from producers to the borders in Ukraine is undertaken by several means 
of transportation. The extent to which these transportation means play a role in grain deliveries can 
be seen in Figure 15. Currently, railway transportation accounts for approximately 70% of grain 
transportation, 27% of grain deliveries undertaken by road using trucks and 3% are by using river 
vessels.  
Figure 15. Internal grain transportation by means of transport (% of grain transported) 
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Source: www.blackseegrain.net
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2.4.1.    Railways 
Figure 16. Railways of Ukraine
29
 
                                                     
27
 Accessed 15 July 2012 http://www.blackseagrain.net/pdfs/bsg-1/Logistics%20and%20transport%2024_03_10.pdf 
28
 Accessed 15 July 2012 http://www.blackseagrain.net/pdfs/bsg-1/Logistics%20and%20transport%2024_03_10.pdf 
29
 Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Uz_map_big_grey.png Accessed 18 July 2012 
 27 
 
 
Rail is an efficient way of transporting crops after harvest. Ukraine has the most dense rail network 
in the world (CIA World Fact Book) that covers all the regions, providing transportation of crops 
across the whole country and to the sea ports (Figure 16).  
The Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznytsia), is a government owned transportation company that has a 
monopoly on railway transportation of grain in Ukraine (Socrat 2010), while industrial railways are 
managed locally on a regional level. The total length of railway tracks is over 22,000 km, which 
makes the Ukrainian railroad network the 14
th
 largest in the world, and 3
rd
 in Europe (Precedent 
2012). It is the world's 7
th
 largest freight transporter. Ukrzaliznytsia has a total of 11.6 thousand 
grain hopper wagons, however, this number has declined over the last three years, as a result of the 
wagon depreciation (nearly 80%) and underinvestment by the state monopoly (Socrat 2010). 
Currently, a large part of the Ukrainian Railways rolling stock is obsolete or will be soon. Based on 
expert estimates, less than 9 thousand wagons are actually used (World Bank 2010b), while the 
average loading rate is 632 wagons a day
30
.  
The grain delivery by rail also differs according to the season, having the peak period in September 
and October. The grain delivery by rail per month can be seen in Figure 17. 
Figure 17. Grain deliveries by rail (2008-2010) 
                                                     
30
 Source: http://www.blackseagrain.net/pdfs/bsg-1/Logistics%20and%20transport%2024_03_10.pdf Accessed 18 July 
2012 
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Source: www.blackseegrain.net
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Transportation by rail is limited due to lack of specialised rolling stock (OECD 2012). However, 
besides the lack of grain wagons, the other bottleneck is low capacity of railway stations located 
near main grain exporting ports and lack of railways in the areas close to these ports (World Bank 
2010b). Occasionally, the railway administration temporarily bans grain supply to some port 
destinations as the railways become blocked with rail cars (USDA 2010). These congested sections 
would require double tracks (World Bank 2010b). These bottlenecks of the rail network restrict the 
mid-term potential for increasing grain production and transit. 
The inflexible wagon reservation practices also complicate exports and contribute to inefficient 
operations of Ukrainian Railway (World Bank 2010b). There were evidences when the railway 
could not supply rail cars due to overbooking, e.g. in the period of November 2011- February 2012 
the grain traders were booking 2,500 wagons per day while the railway could provide them with 
1,250 rail cars only
32
. When the market pushes the volumes and rates of grain transportation, the 
infrastructure cannot cope with it. Rent of grain wagons is relatively cheap, since railway transport 
tariffs are still state controlled (OECD 2012), thus traders try to keep them as long as possible. 
UkrZaliznytsya has tried to address the problem by raising fines for the downtime of railcars to 
quicken their turnover. However, it will be impossible to resolve this problem in future without a 
substantial increase in the number of grain carriers (FAO/EBDR 2010). According to the local grain 
traders' union UZA
33
 Ukraine's grain exports were unlikely to exceed 20 million tonnes in the 
2011/12 season due to shortage of railway grain wagons. The grain production surplus of this year is 
estimated to be around 26 million tons. 
Inefficiencies occur, next to deficit of rail cars, also due to administrative procedures i.e. problems 
with drawing up of the required documents on time. According to the analysis of the Ukrainian 
                                                     
31
 Accessed 15 July 2012 http://www.blackseagrain.net/pdfs/bsg-1/Logistics%20and%20transport%2024_03_10.pdf 
32
 According to Vladimir Klimenko, President of the Ukrainian Grain Association, during the eleventh international 
conference "Grain Forum - 2012" on June 8 http://www.apk-inform.com/en/conferences/grain2012/news/1005343  
33
 Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/03/ukraine-railway-ban-idUSL5E8D31PA20120203 Accessed 12 
July 2012 
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Grain Association
34
 in 2011/12 “A wagon loaded with grain, passing through the territory of 
Ukraine, loses 85% of its time on the road due to handling and processing of documents. Turnover 
of grain cargoes in Ukraine is eight days, which is too long. Two to three thousand wagons with 
corn are idle because of the lack of transfer points". Thus, only 15% of the general transit times the 
rail cars spend on the road. 
Some private companies have invested in grain wagons by purchasing them for themselves in order 
to ensure their own grain transportation and offering it as a service for its customers. For example 
the Eurobank currently owns 250 rail cars and plans to extend it to 1500 in future
35
. Though, 
logistic problems are still a significant obstacle. 
In 2009 there was a significant drop in exports of metal and some other commodities from Ukraine, 
which helped grain trading companies to export grains. If there were active exports of metal, grain 
exporters would face heavier competition for the railway infrastructure (USDA 2010). 
 
 
2.4.2. Roads 
Currently, there is a relatively good road network across Ukraine ( 
 
Figure 18), however, the operational condition of roads is very poor: around 51.1% of roads do not 
meet minimum standards, and 39.2% require major rebuilds. The average speed on roads in Ukraine 
is 2 - 3 times lower than in Western countries (Precedent 2012). Despite the fact that a large part of 
road network is in poor condition, a financing for road construction and maintenance has so far been 
limited (World Bank 2010b). 
 
 
Figure 18. Ukraine major roads
36
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 Source: http://www.neurope.eu/article/russia-kazakhstan-ukraine-grain-pool-talks-stall  NewEurope May 09, 2012. 
Accessed 20 July 2012 
35
 Source: http://www.eurobank-ua.com/eng/clients_partners/82/205/ Accessed 21 July 2012 
36
 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ukraine_Major_Roads.png Accessed 20 July 2012 
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The main road transportation of grain by trucks is used in the grain growing regions close to the 
exporting ports (within 200-300 km). Close to the ports, road transportation is preferred to rail or 
river since it is more profitable and easier in terms of logistics. Several grain producers/traders have 
invested in trucks to transport grain (USDA 2010). However, the problem is that the current 
quantity and quality of access roads to ports in Ukraine do not allow increased traffic (OECD 2012). 
For larger distances, for example transportation to and from EU, international logistics companies 
prefer to use Ukrainian trucks whenever possible. However, according to the World Bank (2010b), 
there are several constraints for road carriers due to the multilateral and bilateral quota systems, EU 
visa problems for Ukrainian drivers, weak financial position and expensive finance, including 
nonstandard leasing arrangements.  
 
2.4.3.     Rivers 
Ukraine has 4.400 km of waterways on 7 rivers, most of them are on Danube, Dnieper and Pripyat 
rivers. The river transportation is supervised by the Ukrrichflot which operates four major and one 
minor river ports along the Dnieper river and its estuaries. The major part of sea connections is 
made via the Black sea ports of Odessa, Sevastopol and Yalta. There is a total of 193 ships: 6 bulk 
carriers, 145 cargo ships, 3 container ships, 6 passenger ships, 4 passenger/cargo ships, 9 petroleum 
tankers, 11 refrigerated cargo ships, 7 roll-on/roll-offs and 2 specialized tankers (in 2007) 
(Precedent 2012). 
Some grain suppliers are considering increasing the use of internal water transportation. For 
example, grain can be transported by railway or roads to river ports and then shipped to exporting 
sea ports or to importing countries (USDA 2010). Currently, the use of the Dnieper River for grain 
transportation is not substantial and therefore developing logistics infrastructure along its bed could 
be explored further (UkrAgroConsult 2010). 
 
2.4.4.    Port infrastructure 
According to the World Bank, Ukraine scored 3.74 in the quality of port infrastructure in 2011. 
Figure 19 illustrates the score for selected transition countries and regions for the last five years. In 
this respect, Ukraine scores close to Russia and Kazakhstan, but below the average level of Europe 
and Central Asia countries (with a score of 4.44) and of the EU (with a score of 5.04) in the last 
year. 
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Figure 19. Quality of port  infrastructure by country 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
W
E
F
 s
c
o
re
Ukraine
Russian Federation
Kazakhstan
Turkey
European Union
Europe & Central Asia (all income
levels)
Europe & Central Asia (developing
only)
OECD members
 
Note: WEF: 1=extremely underdeveloped to 7=well developed and efficient by international standards). 
Source: The World Bank Database: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.WEF.PORT.XQ 
In Ukraine there are 25 sea ports (18 state-run and 7 privately owned) and 12 port terminals on the 
shores of the Black Sea and Azov Sea (USDA 2010). The main seaports and inland waterway ports 
in Ukraine are illustrated in Figure 20. 
Figure 20. The main seaports and inland waterway ports in Ukraine 
 
Source: http://ukrport.org.ua/index-e.htm 
Ukraine’s location in the Black Sea region makes it easier to export grain through seaports. Its port 
infrastructure for grain transhipment has grown rapidly in the last two decades. In the Soviet era the 
port infrastructure was obsolete and was not able to handle increased grain exports, since the port 
infrastructure was import-oriented. In the last decade the yearly capacity of grain transhipment has 
doubled from 15 million tons (2001) to around 30 million tons (2010), with grain storage capacity 
of around 2 million tons. State ports have approximately 17 million tons of transhipment capacity (1 
million tons of storage capacity), and privately owned elevators have capacity of 9 million tons. The 
private sea ports have appeared only in recent years, due to increased grain export and transit 
through Ukraine. 
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The current grain transhipment capacities by port location are illustrated in Figure 21. Almost half 
(46%) of the total grain transhipment capacities in the country are located in the Odessa sea ports, 
Nikolayev ports being the second largest (22%), followed by Crimean ports (12%).  
Figure 21. Grain Transhipment Capacities by Port Location (%) 
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Source: Global Shipping Agency 
Currently 90% of total grain exports are shipped through ports (USDA 2010). Approximately 75-
80% of all grain is exported via the four biggest ports: the three "Big" Odessa Ports – Pivdenniy 
(Yuzhny), Ilichevsk and Odessa,  and the Nikolayev Port (Socrat 2010). The percentage of grain 
transhipped through different ports of Ukraine can be seen in Figure 22. 
Figure 22. Seaports used for grain exports, 2009 
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Source: UkrAgroConsult 
Leading domestic and international private grain traders have their own updated or newly-built 
facilities at one of key ports (Socrat 2010). Increased capacity for grain export and transit is 
attributed to modern private grain port terminals, including Avlita, Traninvestservice, 
Transbulkterminal, Nibulon, Ukrelevatorprom and others (USDA 2010). 
Based on OECD (2010) study, the cargo handling volume of Ukrainian ports is close to the 
maximum capacity, and therefore it could limit the growth of exports of agricultural products in the 
medium term (see Figure 23).  
Figure 23. Cargo handling volume and capacity of main Ukrainian ports 
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Source: OECD (2010), Ukraine Sector Competitiveness Review, internal working document, OECD, Paris.37 
Figure 24. Ukraine grain exports via ports 
 
Source: www.blackseegrain.net
38
 
Ukrainian port infrastructure can currently tranship around 2.6 million tons per month (USDA 
2010) (see Figure 24 for monthly breakdown), which means that currently it can handle around 24-
26 million tonnes of grain exports per year. Thus, according to the projections of 26.4 mil tons of 
grain export in 2011/2012, the total capacity might be sufficient to meet export needs (USDA 2012, 
UkrAgroConsult 2012). However, since the grain transhipment is not distributed equally thought the 
year, there are some difficulties related to limited seasonal capacity, especially in the peak shipment 
period from August to October.  
 
                                                     
37
 OECD 2012 
38
 Source: http://www.blackseagrain.net/pdfs/bsg-1/Logistics%20and%20transport%2024_03_10.pdf Accessed 20 July 
2012 
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Currently, Ukrainian ports continue to receive public
39
 and private investments (USDA 2012), 
however, a national port development strategy is needed to coordinate the plans of individual ports 
(World Bank 2010b). 
 
2.5. Grain storage facilities 
2.5.1. General overview 
Grain storage constitutes an important part of the grain production chain, since it helps to avoid 
losses and excessive costs after the grain have been harvested. All producers and consumers of these 
products, such as farmers, agrarian companies, intermediaries, processing industries and exporters 
need services of qualitative grain storage with sufficient capacity available throughout the year, 
especially during the harvesting season. 
 
There is no official data on the total grain storage capacity, as grain processing plants or other 
private companies that store grain for their own purposes may not report on the storage capacities 
they have. However, according to the estimates of APK-Inform
40
 in 2011 there were around 40.1 
million tonnes of grain storage capacity in Ukraine, and according to the latest estimates there are 
around 45 million tonnes
41
. In 2010 there were around 1100 silos in Ukraine from which 755 were 
certified (with the capacity of 31 million tons) with loading capacity of 1.5 million tons per day 
(Socrat 2010). From the certified grain elevators most are owned by private companies, but the 
largest operator of grain silos is owned by the state. The government owns around 20% of all 
capacities (“Khlib Ukrainy” State Stock Company (SSC) with up to 7 million tons42 and State 
Reserve Fund with 2.1 million tons. The rest of storage capacities are privately held (the largest 
ones include leading grain trading companies, such as Kernel, Louis Dreyfus, Cargill, Bunge and 
WJ Grain) (USDA 2010), Nibulon, Svarog. The breakdown of certified grain storage capacities by 
regions is illustrated in  
 
Figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 25. Certified Grain Storage Capacities by Regions, 2010 (in thousand tons) 
                                                     
39
 Ukraine is intending over the next ten years to invest €20bn in the purchase of equipment for Ukrainian ports, 
according to Vice Premier and Minister of Infrastructure Borys Kolesnikov  
http://www.bne.eu/dispatch21788/Infrastructure_Mon_30_Jul#324368 Accessed 20 July 2012 
40
 According to APK-Inform Agency (March 4 2011) during recent 10 years infrastructure of the grain market of 
Ukraine faced essential changes in both qualitative and quantitative concept. Beginning from 2001 till 2011 the 
general grain storage capacity in the country increased by 70% from the level of 28.2 to 40.1 mln tonnes, and the 
capacities of port shipment grew 3.3 times from the level of 11 to 36.4 mln tonnes  
Available at: http://www.apk-inform.com/en/news/104947 Accessed 25 July 2012 
41
 Source: http://www.apk-inform.com/en/conferences/grain2011/news/1005269 Accessed 25 July 2012 
"Nearly 16 mln tonnes (36%) are the capacities owned by agricultural producers. In particular, 83% of the storehouses 
are floor storage, 76% do not have laboratories of quality evaluation, and 67% have not been modernized in the 
recent 3 years".  
 
42
 Source: http://rada.com.ua/eng/catalog/18112/ Accessed 25 July 2012 
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Source: Ministry of Agrarian Policy 
Based on the estimates of Renaissance Capital (2008) there are more than 700 enterprises 
specialized in grain storage, with only 573 being licensed for commercial grain storage. Many 
producers also do have some temporary storage on their farm, even if these are designed to store 
grain on a temporary basis, many of the producers use these storages all year around. This way they 
do not need to pay rent and are less dependent on quality loss present on elevator storages and less 
subject to risks of not receiving their grain on time during the sales period. Other advantage is that 
this way they do not need to declare their grain production and can sell to anyone at any time at any 
price without being influenced by regional administrations. In 2008 specialised grain silos had 40% 
of total storage capacity, with the rest spread between storage facilities on sites of grain producers
43 
and grain processors. 
The quality of some grain silos built during the Soviet era is low, and their loading capacity is one 
of the constraints for prompt grain trade.
44
 Before the financial crisis of 2008, many grain growing 
and trading companies had plans to build new modern grain elevators, however only some have 
managed to accomplish their projects, as most of them, due to lower credit availability, had to 
reduce their capital expenditures (USDA 2010). 
In 2008, when the production exceeded 53 million tons, grain elevators in some Ukrainian regions 
were reportedly overloaded during the harvesting period and thus producers/processors struggled 
with the lack of grain storage capacity (USDA 2010). This phenomenon occurred also in 2009 and 
2011. Even though, according to APK-Inform grain expert, nearly 45 mln tonnes of grain capacity 
would be quite sufficient for grain store operations in 2012 (together with the planned increase of 
grain production)
45
, there is still an issue that a significant volume of the crop will be stored in 
improper conditions (UkrAgroConsult 2012). The global market requires high quality grain, thus 
the storage facilities would require further investments. Even though the amount of investment in 
the elevator industry of Ukraine has increased, its flow is still insufficient. Mainly large companies, 
which focus on export of grains and oilseeds or their products, are engaged in (re)construction of 
existing elevators, since in the past 40 years no state grain storage facilities werte built 
(UkrAgroConsult 2012, Socrat 2010). 
                                                     
43
 In 2012 grain storage capacity owned by agricultural producers were nearly 16 million tonnes (36%) Available at: 
http://www.apk-inform.com/en/conferences/grain2011/news/1005269 Accessed 26 July 2012 
44
 For example, there are some grain silos with storage capacity of 100,000 tons which load only 10 railcars per day. 
Some farmers have developed on-farm storage capacities as a response to both the lack of large grain silos and to the 
increased price of elevator services.  
45
 Source: http://www.apk-inform.com/en/conferences/grain2011/news/1005269 Accessed 26 July 2012 
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According to some experts' preliminary estimates, building of new silos with high capacity and new 
transfer points for grain would cost Ukraine about 6 billion U.S. dollars.
46
 Strategic planning of 
elevator locations should take into account regional perspectives of grain and oilseed markets 
development, potential for reducing logistics costs, as well as change of enterprise activities in 
response to changing world markets (UkrAgroConsult 2012). 
 
2.5.2. Economics of grain storage 
Grain producers that do not own elevators run the risk of losing crop quality or being forced to sell 
their harvest at unfavourable prices (BG Capital 2010). Many grain farmers currently find elevator 
services for storage and drying expensive and the rising grain storage tariffs during the peak periods 
badly affect growers’ incomes. A number of large agricultural enterprises have thus began 
constructing their own elevators
 47
 in order to have the advantage of tighter control of storage 
conditions, and therefore the quality of product (UkrAgroConsult 2010, Socrat 2010, Renaissance 
Capital 2008). According to Socrat (2010), the silo service business is highly profitable. The 
operating margin varies from 20 - 50% depending on the efficiency and closeness to sea and river 
ports. In 2010 the coverage ratio for elevator capacities was about 70-80%. The silo service cost 
breakdown in Ukraine can be seen in Figure 26. 
Figure 26. Silo service cost breakdown in Ukraine, 2009/10 (% of total costs) 
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Source: Ukraine Ministry of Agriculture, the figures are taken as a % of total.  
The figure shows that the highest costs during the silo storage are drying and monthly storage 
expenses, which represent around 1/4th of total expenses each, followed by shipping and receiving 
expenses, with cleaning costs representing the lowest proportion of total storage expenditure.  
2.6. Grain export chain 
The main economic agents in grain commodity chain in Ukraine can be grouped into: producers, 
processors and traders. Despite the fact that these agents play different roles in the grain commodity 
chain, several economic agents are involved in grain production, processing or/and trade/export as 
well, thus forming large agricultural enterprises that incorporates the grain chain from production to 
export. 
 
                                                     
46
 Source: http://www.neurope.eu/article/russia-kazakhstan-ukraine-grain-pool-talks-stallAccessed 9 May 20124 
47
 Source: http://eastagri.org/publications/pub_docs/ebdr_Ukraine72c.pdf Accessed 25 May 2012 
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2.6.1. Grain producers and processors 
The grain production of Ukraine comes from three different types of farms: households, peasant 
farmers and agricultural enterprises. Mainly the agricultural enterprises are those that are specialised 
in crops for export, while smaller sized individual farms (households and peasant farms) produce 
for internal consumption. Around 70% of the grain production comes from agricultural enterprises 
while only 30% from small and medium sized individual farms: 21% from households and 9% from 
peasant farmers
48
. On average almost half of grain production of Ukraine in the last few years was 
exported and this trend seems to continue and grow in the next years, which would require a well-
developed infrastructure starting from producers to subsequent parts of the grain production chain. 
Grain is usually going from producers to processors or directly to exporters. Around 7 million tons 
of grain supply goes every year to processing industry
49
, however most of the processed grain is 
utilised internally and only marginal proportion of it is exported (e.g. from 2.2 million tons of wheat 
flour produced only 150 tons are exported
50
). The majority of grain leaves the country in 
unprocessed form as bulk product. 
 
2.6.2. Traders 
Foreign investors play an increasingly important role in infrastructure development in Ukraine due 
to profitability of grain export from Ukraine to other parts of the word. The export of grain is in the 
hands of a few companies, most of which are large international agricultural commodity traders. 
The top ten Ukrainian grain exporting companies and the largest wheat flour exporters with the 
percentage of production share can be seen in Table 4 and  
Figure 27, respectively.  These exporting companies often own grain elevators, private ports, rail 
wagons and ships to transport, store, process and export their own grain or grain purchased from 
other producers.  
Table 4. Top 10 exporting companies of wheat and barley, 2010/11
51
  
Company Residence
Export volumes 
(thousands of tonnes)
Share of exports 
(%)
Nibulon Domestic 772.0 25.3
Suntrade/Bunge International 306.4 10.1
Kernel Domestic 249.5 8.2
UAC Domestic 181.4 6.0
Cargill International 140.3 1.6
Sema/Glencore International 137.0 1.5
Louis Dreyfus International 126.4 4.1
Alfred C. Toepfer/ADM International 87.3 2.9
Vitalmar Agro/Nidera International 60.0 2.0
Agro trade Domestic 32.6 1.1
Total 2092.9 62.8  
Source: Investment Capital Ukraine (2010), "Sector Primer Agriculture", Investment Capital Ukraine, Kyiv
52
 
 
                                                     
48
 Calculated based on data from State Statistical Committee 2010 
49
 Source : Grain Ukraine 
50
 Source: http://anyfoodanyfeed.com/en/news/id/918 Accessed 20 July 2012 
51
 Ukraine Exporters Database, Available at: http://www.ukrexport.gov.ua/eng/ukr_export_exporters/  
Accessed 20 July 2012 
52
 OECD 2012 Competitiveness and Private Sector Development: Ukraine 2011, p 91. 
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Figure 27. Largest wheat flour exporters in March 2012
53
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Source: Grain Ukraine 
Large exporters typically enjoy relatively low transport costs and relatively few border-crossing 
problems. Their main logistics problems are related to availability of rail and port capacity and non-
transparent tariffs in rail and port operation. (World Bank 2010b) 
 
2.6.3. Economics of grain export 
 
In order to obtain better knowledge on the economics of grain export in Ukraine, a cost analysis of 
the grain export logistics chain is assessed within this section. The transaction costs (including 
transportation and certification costs) are examined in detail in order to explain the price difference 
between the producer price (farm-gate price) and border/export price (FOB price =free on board). 
For this purpose wheat has been taken as an example. 
 
Figure 28 compares the producer price at farm gate with FOB price
54
 and international price for 
wheat for the last decade. It can be seen that the price margin between farm gate price and FOB 
price has increased after 2006 peaking in 2008 due to increased wheat world market prices (and also 
export restrictions by quotas), which also profited certain group of exporters in these years, since 
farm gate prices were even lower (due to good bargaining position of the exporters)
55
. This 
phenomenon though with a less extent has continued in the following years. 
                                                     
53
 Source: http://anyfoodanyfeed.com/en/news/id/17046 Accessed 30 July 2012 
54
 Border prices include transportation, handling and other costs incurred in bringing the product to the point of trade 
(elevators, railways, ports, quarantine and grain inspection, customs etc) 
55
 A farmer’s location in relation to the main domestic and international markets, and the proximity of the crop to the 
grain handling infrastructure and ports also significantly influence the level of the farm-gate wheat prices and 
revenue. Farmers in remote areas typically receive lower prices than farmers located close to ports. This is 
especially true in situations where farmers compete in the same export markets. Source: FAO 2009 
Agribusiness Handbook: Wheat Flour. Available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/al376e/al376e.pdf 
Accessed 30 July 2012 
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Figure 28. Ukrainian farm gate price of wheat in comparison with border (FOB) prices of Ukraine 
and USA Gulf price. 
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Source: FAOSTAT 
Domestic grain export prices (FOB) are closely correlated with international grain prices. Ukrainian 
prices track world prices minus transportation costs and other charges (Figure 29). Proximity to the 
import markets in North Africa and the Middle East and availability of grain export terminals gives 
Ukrainian grain suppliers a competitive advantage and provides cost effective opportunities to 
export.56  
Figure 29. Freight Rates from Black Sea (2009-2010) 
 
Source: http://www.blackseagrain.net/pdfs/bsg-1/Logistics%20and%20transport%2024_03_10.pdf 
                                                     
56
 Source: http://eastagri.org/publications/pub_docs/ebdr_Ukraine72c.pdf Accessed 30 July 2012 
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Based on the study of Renaissance Capital (2008) grain exporters in Ukraine in 2007 might have 
reached a substantial profit from grain trading by suppressing farm-gate prices and obtaining even 
higher profit margins due to high export prices. Since transport, handling and port charges
57
 are 
relatively low, exporters, due to their quasi-monopoly status, have obtained profits of up to 20% of 
the export (FOB) price. The distribution of costs of wheat based on FOB price is illustrated in 
Figure 30. High export prices favoured exporters only, while farmers could not share these profits 
and received no extra funds so needed for capital expenditures. 
Figure 30. Cost of wheat for export (FOB), % total (2007) 
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Source: Ukrstat, operator's data, Renaissance Capital estimates (Renaissance Capital 2008) 
In 2010 the farm gate prices of grain ranged between 105-109 €/ton (see Table 1 in Chapter 3.1.3.) 
while the export price of Ukrainian wheat (FOB prices at Black Sea ports) rose to 200 €/ton. This 
suggests that margins of up to 100% of the farm gate price (inclusive of transport and handling 
costs) could have been earned by producers if they would be able to obtain an export license. 
Experts' estimates indicate that it costs approximately 20-25% of producer’s price to move grain 
from an inland elevator to a port (CPT basis).
58
 This cost includes inland elevator handling fees (35-
45 UHA/ton), railroad tariffs (depending on the distance: 160-180 UHA/ton from central regions, 
206-220 UHA/ton from western regions, track transportation (1.50-1.80 UHA/ton km), certification, 
and the freight forwarder’s margin (see also Annex 7). It costs an additional UHA 85-170 per metric 
ton to move grain from CPT terms to FOB depending on the port and vessel type. At the moment, 
grain producers in Ukraine are paid slightly more than 60% of the world market price compared 
with almost 90% in France and other exporting countries with efficient infrastructure and marketing 
systems (The Chamber and EBA 2011). Thus, at current market prices of roughly 300 USD/ton, 
producers in Ukraine receive 85 USD/ton less than their competitors in other exporting countries. 
The world practice is that grain producers should receive at least 80% of the FOB price, thus chain 
cost from elevator to ship and the profit margin should not be higher than 20% of the FOB price. 
Non adherence to these rates leads to grain production stagnation
59
. Export restrictions push down 
                                                     
57
 Port charges are regulated by the government, and are limited to covering the costs of grain processing/storage and 
maintenance of facilities 
58
 Source: http://www.expert.ua/articles/7/0/7154/ Accessed 15 September 2012  
59
 Source: Volodymyr Klymenko, Costs analysis of the grain export logistics chain, Agrilogistics 2009 Conference, Sept 
16, 2009, Kyiv, Ukraine
 
 41 
 
the export price, so the farm-gate price, thus the profit of traders and, thus, of producers. The fact 
that grain exporters sell Ukrainian grain at less than world rates is wrong as the state controls it on 
export contract level. 
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3. Institutional reform in Ukraine 
 
Several studies argue that Ukraine’s failure to tap its full production and export potential is mainly a 
result of its market-unfriendly institutional base (IMF 2006, USDA 2002). The process of 
reconstruction of institutions in Ukraine, inherited from the Soviet era, to the market-oriented ones 
has been slow compared to other post-Soviet European countries. Therefore, the establishment of 
market enhancing institutions need even more support, since it is a prerequisite for using its 
resources efficiently. There are several evidences of international support from the EU (e.g. 
EBRD
60
, EU-TACIS
61
), Eastern Partnership  (Comprehensive Institution Building
62
) and other 
international organizations (such as UNDP
63
, USAID & USDA, and IMF) to enhance the 
development of these institutions, however despite some progress made there is still a lot of work to 
be done to develop an adequate institutional framework that is needed to support the development 
of liberalised markets (e.g. fight against corruption improvement of judiciary system, improvement 
of business climate, refraining from introducing protectionist measures)
 64
.  
The necessary measures to support grain market liberalisation include clearly defined property 
rights, enforcement of contracts, credit access, and better market infrastructure (USDA 1998). In the 
absence of these measures the factors of production do not have free movements, which slow down 
the efficiency of the grain sector modernisation. Due to the lack of these the price signals are also 
not transmitted properly to the producers. Thus, even if relative prices are high (e.g. high 
international wheat prices) that might favor expansion, the producers are unable to respond to these 
signals. 
3.1. Current institutional settings in Ukraine 
According to the 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, Europe is the second-freest region in the world 
after North America. Ukraine’s overall economic freedom score is 46.3 (Figure 31 below), making 
its economy the 161st freest in the 2013 Index (out of 177 countries). This Index evaluates countries 
in four broad areas of economic freedom: rule of law; regulatory efficiency; limited government; 
and open markets. Ukraine is scoring well below the European average in most of the 10 specific 
categories (property rights, freedom from corruption, fiscal freedom, government spending, business 
freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial 
freedom), only in fiscal, monetary and trade freedom it scores close to the European average, which 
means the country is “mostly free” in these aspects. This is also due to the price and trade reforms 
that has been fully implemented (USDA 2002
65
) which was also a prerequisite for joining the WTO 
                                                     
60
 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is the largest financial investor in Ukraine 
Accessed May 2013; http://www.ebrd.com/pages/news/press/2012/120913.shtml 
61
 European Union-Technical Assistance to Commonwealth of Independent States (currently run over 400 programs and 
projects on technical and financial cooperation); Accessed 10 May 2013 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_ukraine_en.pdf  
62
 In Ukraine over €43 million was invested for 2011-2013; Accessed 10 May 2013 
http://euukrainecoop.com/2012/12/03/institution/ 
63
 United Nation Development Assistance Framework for 2012-2016  
64
 European Commission 2013: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Ukraine Progress in 2012 and 
recommendations for action, SWD(2013) 84 final. Accessed 10 May 2013 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2013_enp_pack/2013_progress_report_ukraine_en.pdf 
65
 Stefan Osborne and Michael A. Trueblood (2002) Agricultural Productivity and Efficiency in Russia and Ukraine: 
Building on a Decade of Reform, Economic Research Service/USDA, AER-813. Accessed 30 April 2012  
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and opening the markets towards the EU. Currently further reforms are enhanced by the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument and Association Agreement including the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (see chapter 2).  
In all other aspects Ukraine scores below 50, which means the country is “repressed” concerning 
these categories, especially low scores were achieved on rule of low property rights and freedom 
from corruption, as well as on indicators of open markets on investment and financial freedom; 
corruption and investment freedom representing the lowest scores of all indicators. Since these 
problems as well as unstable investment climate are preventing Ukraine from implementing 
structural changes in the agricultural sector, more focus should be paid on improvement of the 
indicators. Here we highlight the importance of these factors for economic freedom in Ukraine. 
Figure 31: Index of Economic Freedom in Ukraine and Europe in 2013 
 
Note: Based on an aggregate score, each country was classified as “free” (i.e. combined scores of 80 or higher); “mostly 
free” (70-79.9); “moderately free” (60-69.9); “mostly unfree” (50-59.9); or “repressed” (under 50).  
Source:  www.heritage.org/index 
3.2. Rule of Law 
The Ukrainian Government has adopted several laws to promote the growth in agriculture, agro-
industry and rural development (The legal framework on Agricultural policies can be seen in Box 
below). However, the market-based legal framework in Ukraine still lags behind other Eastern 
European transition countries. This is mainly due to weak rule of law that is characterizing the 
administrative procedures in the country including lack of the property rights and widespread 
corruption. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/889495/aer813b_002.pdf 
Progress in 2012 and recommendations for action, SWD(2013) 84 final. Accessed May 2013 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2013_enp_pack/2013_progress_report_ukraine_en.pdf 
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Box: Agricultural policy framework in Ukraine 
 
Legal Framework in Ukraine 
Ukraine has adopted a number of laws to encourage agricultural and agro-industry growth and rural development, among those are:  
State Support of Agricultural Sector of Ukraine (2004) including the Agrarian Subsidies Fund establishment, 
Law on Basic Principles of the State Agrarian Policy (2005),  
Law on Grain and Grain Market in Ukraine (2002), the Commercial Code (2004),  
Law on Wholesale Markets of Agricultural Products (2009), 
Law on Support to Utilisation of Biofuel, the Law on Joint-stock Companies (2008),  
Law On State Regulation of Import of Agricultural Products, the Law on Public-private Partnership (2010),  
Law on Protection of Economic Competition (2009).  
Law on Organic Production was drafted together with the Concept of the State Programme of Organic Development in   
Ukraine. 
 
National Development Programme  
The key documents setting out the Government policies for the country, agriculture, rural and agro-industry development include:  
Programme of Economic Reforms for 2010-2014 “Prosperous Society, competitive economy and effective state”;  
Concept of the state target economic programme on development of investment activity for 2010-2015;  
National Program for Rural Development until 2015;  
National Program of Poverty Reduction and Prevention for 2010-2015.  
 
The Ukrainian government has lately become a supporter of biodiesel production. 
Ukraine has with the EU a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement since 1998 with an ENP Action Plan from 2005 and the National 
Indicative Programme for 2011-2013 where support to agro-industry sector development and to trade facilitation is included.  
Together with the UN organisations the country elaborated United Nation Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2012-
2016 entitled: UNITED NATIONS PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK 2012-2016. 
Source:  
FAO 2011, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Europe/documents/Publications/AI_briefs/Ukraine_ai_en.pdf  
 
3.2.1. Property rights  
In Ukraine the property rights are not yet clearly defined. A subcomponent of the Index of 
Economic Freedom, the Property Rights Index measures the degree to which a country’s laws 
protect private property rights, and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. Higher 
scores are more desirable (cores are from 0 to 100), i.e. property rights are better protected. The 
index also assesses the likelihood that private property will be expropriated and analyzes the 
independence of the judiciary system, corruption within it, and ability of individuals and businesses 
to enforce contracts. Ukraine’s Property Rights Index is only at 30%. Compared to the European 
averages (Europe: 62%; Eastern Europe: 48%, Western Europe: 83%) this figure is very low, which 
also means that Ukraine lags far behind almost all European countries together with Russia (Figure 
below). Such conditions greatly discourage the investment in Ukraine. The aim for more liberalised 
markets would be the score above 80% which is the benchmark for most Western European 
countries with well-functioning open markets ( 
Figure 32 below). 
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Figure 32: Property rights index in Eastern European countries in 2013 
 
Source: The Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal
66
   
Figure 33: Property rights index in Western European countries in 2013 
 
Source: The Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal
67
   
The definition of the property rights is essential for the well-functioning agricultural sector. In 
Ukraine the land privatization is still an ongoing process. The functioning land market would be a 
prerequisite for attracting investment to the agricultural sector, especially foreign investments in 
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 http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Europe/Ukraine/property-rights-index#Property Rights Index_notes Accessed 
May 2013 
67
 http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Europe/Ukraine/property-rights-index#Property Rights Index_notes; Accessed 
30 April 2013 
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order to boost grain production and export. At the end of 2012, the Verkhovna Rada adopted Law 
№11315, further extending the moratorium on selling agricultural land until 1 January 201668. 
Under the draft law, potential buyers of farm land can only be the Ukrainian government; regional 
state authorities; the State Land Bank; or Ukrainian citizens. Moreover, only the first three 
categories have the priority right to purchase any agricultural land that is offered for sale. The state 
already stated that it plans to own at least 30% of the Ukraine’s farmland69. All individuals who 
wish to own more than 100 hectares will need to obtain permission from GosZemAgenstvo (the 
State Land Agency). This is a highly controversial requirement because it allows government 
bureaucrats to decide which Ukrainian individuals can own large parcels of farm land. Even though 
foreign investors can acquire land through leasing arrangements (up to 50 years), these mechanism 
are not absolutely transparent. The leasing costs with payments of 3% of the land value are 
burdened with further charges by the state in forms of different types of taxes. Such non-
transparency and lack of competitiveness discourage foreign investors from investing into the 
agrarian sector of Ukraine. A revision of this law would be highly recommended in order to attract 
investment and make the agricultural sector more competitive and efficient in terms of factor use 
(World Bank, 2012b).  
Table 5. Current and potential foreign investors in Ukraine agriculture sector (2013) 
Investor Company Investor country Aquiered 
land (ha)
Aim       
(ha)
Source
Current investors
Lybia 250 000
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/nov/22/food-biofuels-land-grab
Mriya Cyprus 240 000 http://landportal.info/landmatrix/get-the-detail/by-target-country/ukraine
Landkom UK 100 000 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d0bba4f2-3d65-11dd-bbb5-0000779fd2ac, 
dwp_uuid=a955630e-3603-11dc-ad42-0000779fd2ac,print=yes.html;    
MCB Agricol Austria 91 088 http://landportal.info/landmatrix/get-the-detail/by-target-country/ukraine
Aston Lloya UK 82 000 http://landportal.info/landmatrix/get-the-detail/by-target-country/ukraine
AgroGeneration France 51 000 100 000 http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/20142; 
http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/18651
Morgan Stanley USA 40 000 http://blogs.reuters.com/global/2008/06/25/enter-the-new-farmers/;
MK Group Serbia 30 000 100 000 http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/18626
Alpcot Agro Sweden 18 500 http://landportal.info/landmatrix/get-the-detail/by-target-country/ukraine
Potential investors
NCH Capital Western investors 700 000* http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/19672
China  NA** http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/19341; http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/19195
South Korea NA http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/18931
Saudi Arabia NA http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/19845, 
* Ukraine, Russia, Eastern Europe
** Chinese Export-Import Bank is ready to invest USD 10 bill ion into agricultural sector of Ukraine  
Despite these facts on restriction of land markets, the Ukrainian government tries to attract foreign 
investment by softening regulations (e.g. reduced taxes on foreign investment, provision of 
infrastructure and logistical support to investors). It welcomes investors from China, Saudi Arabia, 
South Korea, etc. However, pursuit of farmland investments by foreign investors is causing anxiety 
in local population, since the property rights are not assured and not respected. Currently there are 
several big investors who acquired land (lease for long term – under the current policy regulations) 
in Ukraine. The main foreign investor companies and the amount of land they secure in Ukraine are 
listed in Table below. By summing up, it would mean close to 1 million ha of land (2,5% of total 
agricultural land) that is managed by foreigners, and probably even more that are publicly not 
available. Attracting foreign investors is crucial for development of the Ukrainian economy, 
however, the property rights of the local population should be secured as well. This could be done 
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 http://un.ua/eng/article/421649.html; Accessed 30 April 2013 
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 http://farmlandgrab.org/post/view/18984; Accessed 30 April 2013 
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by following the guidelines adopted by United Nations (United Nation 2012
70
.) It would be 
beneficial if Ukrainian Government implements such measures within the country to protect the 
interest of small farmers. 
 
3.2.2. Corruption  
As it was mentioned before, Ukraine scores extremely low on the freedom from corruption index. 
Ukraine ranks 144 from 174 countries in the Corruption Perception Index
71
 with 26 points out of 
100 in 2012 (one of the most corrupted countries in Eastern European and Central Asia).
 
 
The extent to which different institutions are perceived by the public to be the most affected by 
corruption can be seen in Figure below. This shows that corruption is quite widespread in Ukraine, 
and most institutions are highly corrupted, including judiciary system, public officials and civil 
servants, parliament and legislation, police and also businesses and private sector. While corruption 
has negative affect on all the society, it greatly hampers reform of the Ukraine’s agrarian sector and 
thus impedes functioning of the grain market as well. 
Figure 34: Corruption Perception Index by different institutions in Ukraine (2011)  
 
Note: Scores 0 – Not at all corrupt, 5 - Extremely corrupt 
Source: Transparency International http://www.transparency.org/country#UKR_PublicOpinion 
 
3.2.3. Investment climate 
Doing Business 2013 data for Ukraine shows attractiveness of Ukraine for investors. Ukraine is 
currently ranked 134
th
 (out of 185 economies), which shows a 4.6% points increase compared to the 
previous year of 2012, when it was ranked 152
nd
. The aim of the current government is by the end 
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 Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index shows qualitative assessments of a country's level of corruption in 
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of the 2013 to be between the top-100 countries
72
. The main problems associated with doing 
business in Ukraine are summarized in the Box 1 below. 
 
Box 1: Doing Business in Ukraine 
According to the Doing Business index Ukraine has low attractiveness for investors for doing business. The 
most cited problems include:  
* unpredictability and corruption at borders from custom agents and other technical regulators 
* weaknesses of business climate in general preventing investment in the new production  
* absence of coherent policies to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) 
* inadequacies in the transport network, in particular connecting Ukraine to the European Union  
* customs procedures and cumbersome border inspections that reduce the competitiveness of 
Ukrainian goods, especially those for which timely delivery is critical 
* linkages with industries inherited from Soviet times that are slow to be broken up  
* specific regulations such as mandatory product standards that prevent integration into new markets  
*  slow and costly process of VAT reimbursement (the most cited obstacle in exporters’ surveys)  
* general complexity of regulations relating to export and their unfair enforcement (numerous customs 
permits, registration licenses, technical regulations and certification, related delays and high 
compliance costs 
Source: The World Bank 2010: Ukraine: Trade and Facilitation Study 
 
Despite these obstacles Ukraine also has shown some improvement in areas such as credit access, 
paying taxes, and trading across borders (The World Bank 2010). Out of 132 countries, Ukraine 
ranks 86 in the Global Enabling Trade Index
73
 , which considers four main areas: market access, 
border administration, transport and communications infrastructure, and business environment. In 
order to improve the attractiveness of doing business in Ukraine the policies should address these 
obstacles and also be consistent with Program of Economic Reform of Ukraine for 2010-2014. 
Creating a business-friendly environment, especially in agriculture, should be a top priority in the 
future. 
3.3. State control of the markets 
3.3.1. Nationalisation and monopolisation of grain markets 
The recent developments in the grain market show significant level of nationalization and 
monopolizations, which removes transparency in the grain market and is one of the impediments for 
increasing grain production and export(FAO, 2012) as well as result of increasing corruption. There 
are several evidences of the monopolization of grain trade; for example, activities of state 
companies Khlib Investbud Ltd. and the Agrarian Fund (see Box 2 below).   
 
                                                     
72 http://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/news-from-ukraine/364-glava-derzhavi-doruchiv-uryadu-priskoriti-vikonannya-
programi-jekonomichnih-reform-na-2010-2014-roki Accessed May 2013 
 
73 World Economic Forum 2012: The Global Enabling Trade Report 2012 Accessed May 2013 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GETR/2012/GETR_OverallRankings.pdf 
 49 
 
 
Box 2 
Khlib Investbud Ltd. (KhIB) was created in 2010 to be the state trading agent in the grain market, i.e. with 
exclusive rights to effect all operations connected with grain on behalf of the state. 'KhIB' received a 
contract to purchase 5 million tons of Ukrainian grain for 7 billion hryven [1,400 hryven/tonne]. Then in 
2010 grain export quotas were introduced and the major portion of it was granted to KhIB, whilst other big 
grain export traders were locked out. Now it is Ukraine's main grain trader. Only a few other firms were 
granted export permits74, which is clearly not keeping with the rules of a free market.  
The absence of free grain exports causes significant losses to farmers and consumers. As a result of this 
monopolization, other large transnational corporations that worked in Ukraine for years were forced out of 
the grain business. 'KhIB' monopolised the market and Ukrainian farmers have been forced to sell their grain 
to the company at depressed prices. At the same time, this main state exporter sells the same grain within 
Ukraine at a higher price. In 2011 KhIB sold well over 2 million tons of grain to the Ukrainian Agrarian 
Fund in three batches. Each batch was for an equivalent of 1.4 Bn euros and provided a substantial profit to 
the 'KhIB' and not to the farmers. Such speculations of 'KhIB' in the domestic grain market were one of the 
reasons for the increase of flour prices and thus bread prices in Ukraine. 
Source: http://foreignnotes.blogspot.com.es/2011/03/grain-export-madness.html 
 
3.3.2. Export restrictions 
Signs of monopolization of grain market by the Government were also reviled in the recently 
formulated draft laws, such as the Draft Law #8053 "On amendment to the Law of Ukraine "On 
State support to the agriculture of Ukraine" of February 2, 2011 and the Draft Law #8163 "On 
amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On grain and grain market" of February 25, 2011. These tend 
to introduce state monopoly on export of agricultural products and in particular grain export.  
 
Other evidences of monopolization are reflected by the introduction of the registration of export 
contracts
75
  via single exchange. This is based on the Cabinet of Ministers Resolution from 
December 13, 2010 #1254 "Some Aspects of Conclusion and Registration of Foreign Trade 
Contracts". With this Resolution of February 1, 2011 the Ukrainian Government essentially 
introduced a monopoly of the State Agrarian Exchange on the execution and registration of foreign 
trade contracts for basic agricultural products. This introduces controls over all grain export flows 
and additional expenditures on registration and broker’s fees. Registration fee is 0.5%, plus 0.25-
0.5% broker's fee which are 10 times higher than current market average rate of 0.05% (FAO 2012). 
 
These draft laws have caused great anxiety both internally and externally (e.g. IMF, World Bank, 
EBRD, GAFTA, EBA, American Chamber of Commerce and the U.S.-Ukraine Business Council), 
since these laws and the regulations might cause significant damage to the country. Basically, state 
monopoly is a form of a non-tariff barrier that restricts and controls the trade, and in combination 
with these laws could have negative impact on Ukrainian society and hamper the market economy 
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 According to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, LTD “Khlib Investbud” received 221.3 thd tons of 
wheat to export after second quota allocation in January 2011 out of total of 500 thd tons allowed (more than 40%), 
which was distributed among 15 companies, and besides KhIL, Kernel being awarded 46,100 tonnes and Volary 31,400 
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 According to Decree #832/200 of the President of Ukraine "On Urgent Measures to Promote Production and 
Development of Grain Market" of June 29, 2000, grain export transactions shall be carried out only under export 
contracts, made and registered with exchanges duly accredited for such transactions.  
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by distracting market institutions, increasing non-transparency of administration, rising 
administrative costs, further monopolizing the agricultural sector and damaging the rule of law. 
Monopolization of agricultural markets, including grain market, elimination of competition, 
especially in the domestic grain market, introduction of export limitations, could lead to huge 
income loss for Ukrainian producers, which could progressively lead to degradation of the 
agricultural sector of Ukraine. The monopolization causes negative impact on the business 
environment and restricts the investors from receiving sufficient return on their long term 
investments. Private traders are the major investors in the agrarian logistics and processing systems 
and have been attracting international capital and helped farmers with the liquidity constraints 
during harvesting and seeding campaigns. For the grain producers, export restrictions discourage 
production of grain by putting downward pressure on the farm gate prices and thus providing 
disincentives for investment into the sector. Low prices in the long run will discourage investment 
and thus production will decline
76
. Agrobusiness is one of the opportunities for the better future of 
Ukraine, but short-term actions of the Government might threatening its future development. 
3.4. Financial support to the farmers 
3.4.1. Direct state support to agriculture including VAT exemptions 
The share of agricultural support in the State budget of Ukraine between 2004 and 2007 was stable 
at around 4%, with a peak increase to around 6% in 2008 followed by decrease to around 2% in 
2010
77
. Distribution of state expenditures for agriculture in 2009 and 2010 is shown in Figure 35.  
Figure 35. Composition of the state budget for 2009 and 2010, Ministry of Agrarian Policy of Ukraine 
 
Source: own calculations based on the State Budget data 
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 For example after introducing the export quota in 2010 the domestic price of wheat dropped by 16%, which in future 
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Ausgabe 28, Dezember 2010. Newsletter, Deutsche Beratergruppe Accessed May 2013 
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In 2009 the distribution of state expenditures on agriculture was as follows: 43% for education and 
research, 28% for various subsidies (interest rate subsidy, support to crop and animal production, 
young permanent crops, hop production), 9% for coordination and management, 14% for 
compensation to the State Pension Fund, 2% for support to the State Agrarian Fund and 1% for 
support to development of rural infrastructure. The largest items of state budget support for 
agriculture in 2009 and 2010 were subsidies to colleges and universities for agricultural education 
with 1.7 billion UAH reserved in 2009 and 1.9 billion UAH in 2010. Besides these, there has been a 
substantial support increase for the State Agrarian Fund to 255 million UAH in 2010, while state 
support for other activities as well as total budget support for 2010 has decreased. 
Figure 36. Government support for animal production 2008-2011 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from State Statistical Service of Ukraine 
Error! Reference source not found. and Figure 37 show analysis of data from the State Statistical 
Service of Ukraine on total support to crop and animal production. It is important to mention that 
data from the State Statistical Service of Ukraine is aggregation of the amounts of subsidies from 
the state budged of Ukraine as well as VAT payment exemptions applicable to agricultural 
producers. The data has been analysed for the period between 2008 and 2011 and allows us to 
separate data for crop and animal production as well as for private farms and agricultural 
enterprises. 
Figure 37. Government support for crop production 2008-2010 
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Source: own calculations based on data from State Statistical Service of Ukraine
 
The figures show that more government support has been provided to large agricultural enterprises 
than to private farms in terms of value and that support to animal production has decreased by 
around 2.5 times during the period 2008 - 2011. In terms of support to crop production (see Figure 
37) we see a significant increase in support for agricultural enterprises, which in monetary terms has 
risen from 1.5 billion UAH to around 2.5 billion UAH. There was a drop in support in 2009 though, 
which is attributable to financial crisis.  
In terms of private farms the tendency for rising support has not been observed. Such governmental 
policy is not very clear if we take into account the facts that larger enterprises have better access to 
credits, markets in general and can better apply the economies of scale compared to smaller private 
farms. In Figure 38 we have calculated the government support for crop production per harvested 
area for private farms and agricultural enterprises to analyse whether the rise in support for crop 
production for agricultural enterprise is due to increase in harvested area, however this does not 
appear to be the case. 
Figure 38 Government support for crop production per harvested hectare 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from State Statistical Service of Ukraine 
The dynamics of support in both Figure 37 and Figure 38 correspond to each other confirming 
increased governmental support to crop producing for agricultural enterprises, which has almost 
reached the level of support to smaller private farms per harvested hectare. We can also observe that 
governmental support to private farms does not appear to be very stable between 2008 and 2011 
combining raises and falls of around 30-40% from year to year. 
During 2012 the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine (ACoU) carried audits of measures under 
National Program for Rural Development until 2015 and State Program of Technical Assistance to 
Agriculture until 2015. As a result of audits it has been determined that a little was done by the 
government and local authorities to resolve the decline of social infrastructure and deepening 
demographic crisis in rural communities78. This corresponds to our analysis above showing 
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 Report of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine for 2012, http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/control/main/uk/publish/ 
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decreased support for rural development programs and low levels of subsidies for small local 
producers. In the 2012 report, ACoU emphasized on shortcomings of regulatory support to rural 
areas and lack of coordination between various agricultural support programs. The lack of 
coordination between central and local authorities in terms of tasks, resources and deadlines has 
been observed as well. In particular, it has been noted, that the Ministry of Agrarian Policy of 
Ukraine as coordinator of the State Program for Rural Development until 2015 did not ensure 
proper monitoring of the program, while implementation authorities did not carry activities in due 
time.  
Similar situation has been observed in implementation of the State Program of Technical Assistance 
to Agriculture until 2015. The financing of both programs for 2011 was approximately 68,6% and 
45,6% of the pre-envisaged expenditures79. This resulted in underfunding of some measures, while 
others have not been funded or completed at all. These include construction of social infrastructure, 
support for development of the depressed areas, funding for protection, restoration and 
improvement of soil fertility, reconstruction of distilleries for biofuel production, reform to the state 
system of agricultural education. The critical situation with technical support to agriculture has been 
confirmed by the audit of the State Program of Technical Assistance to Agriculture until 2015. 
During the audit ACoU observed continued decrease in the numbers of agricultural equipment, 
including tractors and combine harvesters, while dependence on imported spare parts for the 
agricultural equipment has increased. 
 
3.4.2. State support to credit access 
After the Independence and in the transition period between 1996 and 1999, the Government 
implemented a state commodity credit program that had extremely bad consequences on the 
performance of agricultural sector (World Bank/OECD 2004). It provided input credit in kind to 
agricultural enterprises in exchange for the state grain procurement contracts. Private sector input 
supply and grain marketing activity declined sharply as a result, leading to further declines in 
agricultural output. Poor collection rates for the state commodity credit program and declining 
output ultimately led to the abandonment of the program in 1999, and a debt write-off, which 
represented 44% (5.4 billion in 2000 and 0.8 billion in 2001) of the total amount of debts (World 
Bank/OECD 2004, OECD 2001). 
Prior to 1999, farmers didn’t own their land. This eliminated incentives not only for efficiency, but 
also it was impossible to get a credit system running since no collateral was available (OECD 2004). 
At the moment, there is still no free market on land and therefore the land cannot be used as 
collateral for accessing credit. According to the World Bank/OECD (2004) Ukraine is asset rich by 
estimating the rural land alone to be worth about US$40 billion. Thus, the legal and institutional 
framework for the use of this land as collateral is important to set. 
In order to establish the basis for development of a functioning rural finance and credit market in 
Ukraine, the following global measures were implemented (OECD 2001): i) debts owed by 
agricultural producers to the state were written off, ii) agricultural enterprises were restructured, 
which resulted in improvement of the sector’s profitability, iii) the state withdrew from input and 
product markets, resulting in more competition in these markets and establishment of more 
favourable producer prices, and iv) a “softer” tax treatment was introduced.  
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In early 2000s a more stable macroeconomic framework and decrease in interest rates made access 
to agricultural credit easier compared to the tight credit constraints of the 1990s (World 
Bank/OECD 2004). In addition, since 2000, in order to improve access to finance and credit 
markets, the government implemented a programme of partial compensation of interest rates on 
commercial bank loans for agricultural producers, funded from the state budget (OECD 2007). 
Compensation was set at 50% of the National Bank of Ukraine refinance rate with a minimum of 
17.5% on loan agreements with commercial banks (OECD 2001). In 2000 UAH 175 million were 
allocated for interest rate compensation, UAH 818 million were lent to 4150 agro-industrial 
complex enterprises (with partial interest rate compensation of UAH 50 million due to delays in 
implementation of the scheme), 92% of them were agricultural enterprises, the rest were service and 
downstream enterprises. Agricultural enterprises also accounted for the major amount of credit 
(UAH 455 million, 56% of the total). All types of agricultural producers (small, medium and large) 
received subsidised loans. In particular individual private farms obtained 4% of the total amount of 
loans disbursed to agricultural producers. In 2000, 51 commercial banks participated in this 
preferential credit scheme. The major lenders were the Bank Ukraina (25%), Prominvestbank 
(16%), Ukrsotsbank (5%), Privatbank (5%), Nadra (3%) and Ukreximbank (3%). The lowest annual 
interest rate was 28%, and the highest 60%. The average repayment rate was 86%. The highest 
repayment rate of 92% was by agricultural services. These repayment levels increased banks’ 
confidence in agricultural producers as borrowers (OECD 2001). In 2010 around 80 private banks 
took part in farmer lending programs.
80
 
In 2001 a differentiated compensation rate was introduced. For agricultural producers and grain 
purchasing and processing enterprises a higher rate was applied (up to 70% of the NBU discount 
rate), while other beneficiaries were eligible only for 50% (OECD 2001). This differentiation 
favoured the large grain producing enterprises. This has delayed the reform and caused 
inefficiencies in the overall agricultural production system; since the subsidized credits, 
investments, tax breaks and debt write-offs were all contributing to the short-term objective of 
stimulating agricultural growth and did not encourage to improve agricultural efficiency in the long-
run. Therefore, many inefficient large enterprises came into existence and started to dominate on the 
grain market, while some of the most efficient producers, individual farmers have hardly received 
any governmental support at all. 
Before the accession to WTO the Ukrainian Government has taken some steps towards reforms and 
made investments in access to finance and risk management instruments (World Bank 2008a). In 
2009, in order to increase credit support for agriculture, National Bank has issued a Decree № 650 
to encourage banks to lend on security of future agricultural production (next year’s harvest, cattle 
and calves, etc.). This made somewhat easier for the small farms to access the credit as for them the 
next harvest is the only possible collateral.
81
  
  
3.4.3. Credit access by agricultural producers 
Low profitability of agriculture, and the lack of appropriate property rights and credit legislation 
restricted the availability of credit for agriculture. Difficulty in accessing the finance resulted in low 
inputs use and insufficient capital investment, it is especially a main concern for small and medium-
sized farmers, which limits their ability to invest in operational activities and fixed assets (OECD 
2009). Therefore, low access to finance is also limiting the increase of land productivity.  
Based on the OECD survey (2011), among 85 farms 58% claimed that they did not have sufficient 
access to credit (Figure 39). The key problems mentioned were high interest rates (cited by 76% of 
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surveyed farms) and the absence of appropriate collateral (cited by 32% of respondents). (OECD 
2012) 
Figure 39. Percentage of farmers having difficulty in obtaining credit 
Short and long-
term credit
 22%
Only short-term 
credit
 37%
Only long-term 
credit
 41%
 
Source: OECD (2011), Country Capability Survey, internal working document, OECD, Paris
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Currently, commercial interest rates on agricultural loans range from 25 to 30 percent, 50% of 
which are compensated by the Government. Banks usually require 200% to 300% collateral, 
depending on the farm’s credit history and risk level (OECD 2009), which is for most small farmers 
is difficult to provide. However, the future crop can be also served as collateral. As an example, the 
main challenges related to grain crop used as collateral are illustrated in Box 2. Furthermore, 
collateral can also be offered in form of livestock, farm machinery, or personal property of the farm 
owner. Though, these usually serve as collateral for receiving a short-term credit to cover the 
immediate input costs only and do not suit for long-term investments.  
 
Box 2. Challenges faced by the current system of warehouse receipts for grain 
The introduction in 2002 of a system of warehouse receipts for grain was in part aimed at improving access to private 
credit resources by allowing grain producers to use grain as collateral for loans, or to sell, trade or use the receipts for 
delivery against financial instruments such as futures contracts. However, the system still faces a number of challenges 
that continue to limit farmers' access to credit by undermining the trust of the financial institutions in the system, 
including: 
- Lack of coherence in the legal framework: Different laws give contradicting rules with regard to the rights, liabilities 
and responsibilities of each party to the single and double warehouse receipts (producer, warehouse, bank etc). 
- Inadequate monitoring system: Although private and independent mechanisms for verifying the quality and quantity of 
stored commodities exist, these mechanisms are costly for grain owners. In addition, verifying agents often have limited 
access to the state-owned storage facilities. 
- No reliable performance guarantees: Holders of warehouse receipts do not receive adequate compensation if stored 
goods do not match in quantity or quality with what is specified on the receipt (due to either negligence or fraud). 
- Ineffective futures exchange market: Agricultural market operators cannot hedge effectively against price fluctuations 
using futures contracts due to the absence of a well-developed futures exchange. Although the government established 
an Agricultural Exchange, the latter cannot be considered an exchange in the traditional sense of the word. Rather it 
constitutes a focal point for registering the Agrarian Fund's contracts. The Agricultural Exchange's activities are thus 
largely determined by the Agrarian Fund. Under these conditions the exchange fails to attract private investors by 
limiting the liquidity of exchange contracts.  
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Source: FAO/EBRD (2010) "Ukraine: Grain Sector Review and Public Private Policy Dialoge", Report Series, No. 15, 
December 2010. http://eastagri.org/publications/pub_docs/ebdr_Ukraine72c.pdf 
As it has been mentioned before, under the current legislation, land still cannot be used as a 
collateral. After finalization of the reforms on land property rights farmers would be able to use land 
as collateral to obtain not only short-term, high-interest loans, but also to invest in long-term capital 
improvements, such as agricultural machinery or storage facilities. These long term investments 
would allow them to improve crop yields by investing in machinery and on-farm storage facilities to 
be able to sell their crops for better prices and not for the suppressed prices offered by the traders 
during the harvesting season. Currently, large farms avoid many of these problems, as they have 
better access to finance.  
Despite the good foresight on land to be used as collateral, there are issues in both sides. On one 
hand many farmers do not really trust the Ukrainian banking system (which is still unstable) and are 
reluctant to risk losing their land in case of default. Furthermore, many agricultural enterprises are 
comprised of hundreds of shareholders, whose permission would need to be obtained before they 
could use the land as collateral. On the other hand, the land is also not willingly accepted by banks 
as collateral, since it is difficult to foreclose on land in case of default. Due to ineffective legislative 
framework, which does not necessarily protect creditors’ interests, the financial institutions are even 
more cautious about lending and it has a detrimental effect on small and medium-sized farmers. The 
lack of collateral or credit history is a significant constraint on small farmers' access to credit from 
commercial financial institutions. (OECD 2009, OECD 2011) 
Some farms chose to attract investors who can provide capital, market experience and collateral to 
secure loans. However, the risk of these arrangements is that farmers to some extent lose control of 
farm operations, since often the investment/holding company insists on maintaining control over 
every aspect of production and takes over the farm, equipment and land. This situation forces 
farmers to enter into extended leases of 5-10 or even more years since they depend heavily on cash 
from the holding company (World Data Centre 2004). 
It has been observed that already-successful farms continue to expand as shareholders pull out their 
land from failing farms and lease their plots to the stronger ones (World Data Centre 2004). 
According to USDA many farms will not be able to survive the transition to market economy, and 
high-risk farms with few liquid assets, heavy debt, bad credit history and poor management will 
collapse
83
. Only the most efficient farms will survive, though the government still has a preference 
in supporting big agricultural enterprises, even with their low productivity, due to lobbying, which 
makes difficult for the more efficient small and medium farms to survive and grow.  
As a summary we can say that even if credit would be available to most farmers the interest rates 
and collateral demands are still too high for the farmers to accept such credits. Difficulty in 
obtaining agricultural credit, especially large, long-term loans, remains a significant problem for 
many, especial for small and medium farms, and it is still a major constraint for the development of 
the primary agricultural sector.  
3.5. State support for infrastructure development 
The development of market infrastructure (which incorporates transport/trade infrastructure) is one 
of the target areas of the Ukrainian agricultural policy (which is part of the State Targeted Program 
for Development of the Ukrainian Countryside up to 2015 introduced in 2007 (OECD 2011)), 
prepared to increase efficiency and international competitiveness of the agricultural sector as laid 
down in the 2005 Law on Basic Principles of the State Agrarian Policy up to 2015. 
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 USDA 2002: http://www.fas.usda.gov/pecad2/highlights/2002/06/ukr_report/index.htm Accessed 20 August 2012 
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Financial support for infrastructure in the last decade given by the State was continuously increasing 
(Figure 40). This partly helped to the development of the grain sector, however private investments 
have made much greater contribution during this period (FAO 2012). Deregulation of the markets is 
therefore extremely important to support private investment in the infrastructure. 
Figure 40. State support provided for infrastructure in Ukraine (1990-2000) 
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Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine 
 
Besides improving investment in the infrastructure itself and deregulating the markets to attract 
private investment, Ukraine should improve its policy regulations related to customs, infrastructure 
and service quality. This will improve the performances indicators of the LPI index, which all score 
very low for Ukraine.  
In order to improve the customs efficiency, Ukrainian Parliament has adopted the Law "On 
Amendments to the Customs Code of Ukraine and Other Legislative Acts of Ukraine", which came 
into force on 1 January 2012. It has been designed to, inter alia, harmonize the customs legislation 
of Ukraine with international conventions and World Customs Organization SAFE Framework 
Standards. These changes include speeding up (setting a maximum of 4 hours) and simplification of 
the customs clearance procedures, a more efficient customs audit, procedures for establishment of 
the customs value, introduction of the “Authorised Economic Operator” responsible for customs 
operations, establishing sanctions for unlawful decisions and actions. These changes shall allow for 
ensuring traceability of trans-border shipments of grain and make the grain export more efficient. 
In the Transport Strategy of Ukraine for the period up to 2020
84
 several improvements are planned 
to be made. In order to improve the public governance for transport sector the following steps are 
planned, e.g. reform of the public governance system for railways, public roads, and sea commercial 
ports; improving the staff potential and increasing the social security level for transport employees, 
implementing institutional reforms aimed at developing and improving market relations in the 
transport sector; establishing conditions for fast transfer of transit goods; improving the licensing 
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 Transport Strategy of Ukraine for the period of up to 2020 Accessed May 2013 http://www.transport-
ukraine.eu/en/page/transport-strategy-ukraine-until-2020 
 58 
 
system for certain types of activities in the transport sector. For improvement of the effectiveness of 
custom brokers, among others, setting up the multifunctional integrated system – Electronic 
Customs; creating, with the use of EU customs electronic databases, an inter-state information 
exchange system to ensure the efficient operation of border crossing points; introducing automated 
systems for rail rolling stock transfer from the wide-gauge track to the narrow-gauge one; improving 
the customs statistics system to monitor and forecast the goods transit. All these improvements will 
help to deliver better quality infrastructure service which would have positive impact on the service 
delivery performances concerning the time, costs and reliability of delivering the product to its 
destination (on time and safe). 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Commodity balances of main products in Ukraine
85
 
 
1. Meat balance of main types 
(thousands tons) 
 
 2009 2010 
 
meat, 
total 
 
including 
 
 meat, 
total 
 
including 
beef 
and 
veal 
 
pork  
poultry 
other 
kinds 
of 
meat 
 beef 
and 
veal 
 
pork  
poultry 
 other 
kinds 
of 
meat 
 
Production 
 
Change of stocks 
at the end of year 
Import 
 
Total resources 
Export 
 
1917      453      527      894        43 
 
16          2          9          6        -1 
 
439        14      225      196          4 
 
2340      465      743    1084        48 
 
40        20          0        19          1 
 
     
 
2059      428      631      954        46 
 
-3        -8        -4          8          1 
 
378        25      193      157          3 
 
2440      461      828    1103        48 
 
48        13          1        33          1 
 
  
 
2. Balance of milk and milk products 
(thousands tons) 
 
 
 
 
1995 
 
2000 
 
2005 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
Production 
Change of stocks end 
of year 
 
Import 
 
Total resources 
 
Export 
 
 
17274     12658     13714     12262     11761     11610     11249 
 
-440        -394           27          -72          -78         230          -11 
 
58           50         112         199         234         455         273 
 
17772     13102     13799     12533     12073     11835     11533 
 
1420       1100       1901         939       1140         919         956 
 
  
3. Balance of eggs (including egg products) 
(thousands tons
1) 
 
 
 
 
1995 
 
2000 
 
2005 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
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 Data according to State Statistical Committee of Ukraine “Agriculture in Ukraine - 2011” 
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Production 
Change of stocks end 
of year 
Import 
 
Total resources 
 
Export 
 
544         508         753         812         863         919         985 
-11             2           13           10           20           12             9 
 
5             2             5             3             7             7             7 
 
560         508         745         805         850         914         983 
 
4             0             1           16           23           58           75 
 
 
1   
 Average  weight of egg – 57,75 g. 
 
 
4. Grain balance (including products of grain processing counted as grain) 
(thousands tons) 
 
 
 
 
 
1995 
 
2000 
 
2005 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
Production 
Change of stocks end 
of year 
Import 
Total resources 
Export 
 
33930     24459     38016    29295     53290    46028     39271 
 
-757       1329       -314        948       9952     -6079     -2054 
 
200       1010         226        343         222        136         175 
 
34887     24140     38556    28690     43560     52243     41500 
 
814       1330     12650      4490     16668    26160     14239 
 
 
 
5. Potatoes balance 
(thousands tons) 
 
 
 
 
1995 
 
2000 
 
2005 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
Production 
 
Change of stocks end 
of year 
Import 
 
Total resources 
 
Export 
 
14729     19838     19462     19102     19545    19666     18705 
 
-1090       2951       -100           57         423         156       -410 
 
126           11             5             7           10           15           30 
 
 
15945     16898     19567     19052     19132     19525     19145 
 
16             1             6             3             3             5             8 
 
 
 
6. Balance of vegetables, water-melons, melons and gourds (including canned and dried 
products counted as fresh) 
 
(thousands tons) 
 
 
 
 
1995 
 
2000 
 
2005 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
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Production 
 
Change of stocks end 
of year 
Import 
Total resources 
 
Export 
 
 
6377       6195       7606      7317       8489      8976       8873 
 
100         201         196         -85         689        534         -22 
 
41           29         100        158         356        232         311 
 
6318       6023       7510      7560       8156      8674       9206 
 
194           30         150        298         251        347         335 
 
  
7. Balance of fruits, berries and grape (including canned and dried products counted as 
fresh) 
(thousands tons) 
 
 
 
 
1995 
 
2000 
 
2005 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
Production 
 
Change of stocks 
end of year 
Import 
Total resources 
 
Export 
 
 
2355       1966        2133     1829       1919      2087       2154 
 
120         201          297         52         245        131           10 
 
309         179          860     1254       1235      1139       1130 
 
2544       1944       2696       3031       2909       3095       3274 
 
31           88          305       370         252        284         353 
 
  
8. Balance of sugar (including the main sugar-containing products counted as sugar) 
(thousands tons) 
 
 
 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Production 
Change of stocks end of year 
Import 
Total resources 
Export 
 
2139     1867     1571     1275     1805 
247      -228      -477      -561         32 
177         25         91         92         90 
2069     2120     2139     1928     1863 
154       120       103         88         65 
 1  
Excluding imported raw sugar used in sugar production 
 
 
9. Balance of oil (including the main oil-containing products counted as oil) 
(thousands tons) 
 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Production 
 
Change of stocks end of year 
Import 
Total resources 
Export 
 
1437      2294      1966      2899   3101 
114       -150        117         -30   -151 
264        410        480        316     319 
1587      2854      2329      3245   3571 
900      2140      1590      2483   2850 
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Annex 2. Agriculture group Commodities
86 – Import (thousand tons; eggs in millions of pieces) 
Code Denomination 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
  Group 2                       
202 Beef, frozen: 1,6 1,4 0,4 0,3 3,6 30,9 19,3 9,1 18,7 8,9 3,6 
203 Pork fresh, cooled or frozen: 1,1 1,8 1,3 9,6 49,2 46,4 47,2 62,3 178,8 140,8 108,6 
206 
Food subproducts of cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, 
horses, donkeys, mules, fresh, cooled or frozen: 1,0 1,5 3,6 1,7 6,5 7,6 4,3 4,9 24,4 39,5 39,8 
207 
Meat and food subproducts of poultry trade 
position 0105, fresh, cooled or frozen: 26,0 67,3 71,8 100,7 295,7 141,8 151,9 131,5 256,1 193,2 154,6 
209 
Pig & poultry fat, fresh, cooled frozen, salted, dried 
smoked: 0,1 2,9 1,4 2,1 3,1 20,9 7,1 0,0 34,1 47,3 42,0 
  Group 3                       
302 Fish, fresh or chilled (no fillets or other meat): 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,4 2,3 6,1 9,2 8,7 9,2 
303 Fish, frozen (no fish fillets or other fish meat): 182,3 246,4 223,4 215,2 239,3 330,3 262,4 295,4 348,4 311,8 344,2 
304 Fish fillets & other fish meat, fresh, chill or frozen: 2,2 3,2 4,6 9,5 14,0 32,1 50,3 78,9 123,6 71,4 53,2 
305 Fish, dried, salted etc, smoked etc, ed fish meal: 10,8 25,2 21,6 18,5 4,9 3,7 6,4 4,3 3,9 2,7 2,2 
306 Crustaceans, live, fresh etc, and cooked etc: 0,2 0,3 0,5 1,4 1,2 2,3 8,4 13,5 13,2 7,1 9,9 
307 Mollusks & aquatic invertebrates nesoi, live etc: 1,3 0,7 0,7 0,3 0,3 1,8 2,8 7,5 9,3 2,1 4,4 
  Group 4                       
401 
Milk and cream, non-condensed without sugar 
addition: 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,4 0,5 0,6 1,4 2,2 1,2 0,7 1,2 
402 Milk and cream, condensed or with sugar addition: 0,9 0,3 0,4 1,3 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,5 0,3 10,2 4,9 
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 According to the Harmonization System Codes (HS Code) Commodity Classification 
 68 
 
403 
Buttermilk, yoghurt, kefir and others or acidified 
milk and cream: 4,8 12,4 17,1 20,1 19,5 25,4 29,5 33,1 23,7 7,0 7,3 
404 Milk serum: 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,6 1,6 1,8 2,3 2,7 2,3 2,3 
405 Butter and other fats made of milk: 0,8 1,5 1,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,8 2,8 16,3 6,1 
406 Cheeses of all types and lactic cheese: 1,2 1,8 1,9 2,1 3,0 5,5 8,5 11,9 13,1 9,1 11,2 
407 Eggs of poultry in shells: 0,9 1,5 2,7 3,1 3,3 4,2 3,8 2,2 5,2 5,6 4,6 
  Group 8                       
801 Coconuts, brazil nuts & cashew nuts, fresh or dry: 0,1 0,6 0,4 0,6 0,7 1,5 3,0 3,2 3,6 2,8 2,4 
802 Nuts nesoi, fresh or dried: 2,6 4,0 3,5 3,9 4,7 6,4 8,2 11,0 14,0 4,1 4,9 
803 Bananas and plantains, fresh or dried 59,5 55,5 79,1 87,0 67,6 249,4 272,0 297,1 278,3 227,3 214,8 
804 
Dates, figs, pineapples, avocados etc, frozen or 
dried: 0,4 0,8 0,9 1,1 1,8 7,7 10,8 13,1 13,7 9,3 12,4 
805 Citrus fruit, fresh or dried: 79,2 102,4 123,7 136,4 141,4 256,4 329,0 364,7 344,4 342,1 363,4 
806 Grapes, fresh or dried: 7,5 10,5 13,9 17,3 18,4 37,5 73,6 84,8 77,8 49,0 55,5 
808 Apples, pears and quince, fresh 1,9 1,3 0,2 0,1 0,7 44,1 123,0 144,1 183,7 254,6 207,1 
809 
Apricots, cherries and sweet cherries, peaches, 
plums and dog rose, fresh: 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 0,0 13,2 21,8 9,9 47,1 39,7 43,0 
810 Other fruits, fresh: 4,2 6,1 9,4 12,9 8,0 27,7 47,9 58,8 56,9 48,2 54,2 
811 Fruits and nuts, raw or cooked, frozen: 0,3 0,7 1,4 1,2 1,0 1,9 2,1 3,7 4,6 3,5 5,5 
813 Fruits dried: 0,5 3,3 2,7 2,5 2,8 5,6 7,4 9,4 10,8 7,1 6,3 
 Group 10            
1001 Wheat and wheat mix with rye (meslin) 673,4 181,9 4,5 3076,2 593,7 9,5 1,9 1,8 1,7 0,9 1,3 
1002 Rye 15,3 7,2 0,0 261,5 10,6 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,1 2,0 
1003 Barley 22,9 27,7 18,1 32,9 23,7 0,5 20,2 9,2 1,3 0,3 10,5 
1004 Oat 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 6,3 3,1 0,0 0,0 
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1005 Corn 92,0 3,3 4,6 21,5 14,0 12,9 15,7 23,9 33,3 17,9 30,5 
1006 Rice 64,2 75,9 78,9 86,4 102,3 127,4 111,2 121,3 73,6 76,8 63,6 
1007 Sorghum grain 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,5 1,4 0,2 0,0 
1008 
Buckwheat, millet and canary grass seeds; other 
grain crops 0,1 0,1 1,0 0,6 0,1 0,0 0,4 3,8 0,6 0,1 0,0 
 Group 12            
1201 Soja beans, milled or not 0,0 0,3 13,0 0,7 0,2 0,1 1,5 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,9 
1202 peanuts (ground-nuts), raw 15,5 19,9 27,4 29,9 33,6 41,1 32,7 35,7 36,1 22,0 28,8 
1204 Flack seeds, milled or not  0,3 0,1 0,0 0,4 0,3 0,5 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
1205 Bitter cress or rape seeds  0,1 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,6 1,5 2,7 4,6 1,8 2,0 
1206 Sunflower seeds, milled or not 0,6 1,0 0,9 1,3 4,6 3,1 4,4 6,7 7,8 5,5 6,8 
1207 Other oil crops seeds and fruits 0,4 0,5 0,3 2,5 0,2 3,7 2,9 2,2 4,7 2,2 4,8 
1208 
Flour from oil crops seeds or fruits, except mustard 
flour 8,9 35,1 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,1 
1209 Sow seeds, fruits and spores 2,3 1,7 1,5 1,4 1,6 1,4 1,9 2,2 2,9 2,2 2,8 
1210 hop cones, fresh or dried, lupulin 0,1 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,5 0,4 
1211 
Plants, plant fractions, seeds and fruits used mainly 
in perfumery, medicine or as mosquito repellents, 
parasite killers etc. fresh or dried, in pieces or 
whole, fractioned or not, milled or not 1,0 1,2 0,8 1,5 1,0 1,5 1,7 2,2 3,1 1,8 2,3 
1212 locust beans, seaweed, s beet & cane: fruit pits etc. 0,1 0,3 0,5 0,7 0,9 109,8 26,0 19,5 1,5 0,6 1,1 
  Group 15                       
1511 Palm oil & its fractions, not chemically modified: 24,7 89,2 113,9 94,2 130,3 203,8 185,5 341,6 413,3 265,4 279,9 
1513 
Coconut, palm kernel or babassu oil etc, not ch 
mod: 7,5 10,2 11,5 14,8 18,8 27,2 26,5 30,9 30,8 27,6 32,3 
1516 
Plants or animal fats and oil hydrogenyzed, 
20,0 26,1 33,8 19,6 16,0 12,5 9,0 13,7 14,9 16,0 14,1 
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interetherifized, refined or not: 
1517 Margarine, edible mixtures etc an or veg fat & oil: 9,0 13,0 24,1 32,1 24,3 33,8 35,7 49,0 45,1 38,0 41,5 
1520 Glycerol (glycerine), glycerol waters and lyes: 0,5 0,6 0,2 0,3 0,8 1,5 3,7 4,2 7,1 12,5 14,8 
  Group 18                       
1801 Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted: 20,7 22,3 15,5 15,6 14,4 17,7 17,1 20,3 17,8 15,8 14,1 
1803 Cocoa paste, defatted or not: 1,4 0,9 6,4 7,5 9,4 13,3 14,3 16,6 19,6 18,6 19,5 
1804 Cocoa butter, fat and oil: 2,9 2,7 3,6 3,1 3,8 5,5 6,6 7,3 8,0 6,6 8,3 
1805 Cocoa powder, not sweetened: 9,9 12,6 12,3 12,3 14,0 18,5 19,8 22,0 24,5 20,8 21,9 
1806 Chocolate & other food products containing cocoa: 7,2 9,5 8,7 9,1 72,6 157,8 120,5 30,8 56,7 37,7 31,4 
  Group 21                       
2101 Extracts etc of coffee, tea or mate, roast chicory: 1,7 4,5 7,6 12,5 15,6 27,3 34,1 36,7 52,8 37,3 35,7 
2102 
Yeasts, dead sing-cell micro-org nesoi, baking 
powder: 3,3 7,5 7,9 5,6 12,5 13,9 7,1 4,4 3,0 1,9 1,9 
2103 
Sauces & prep, mixed condiments, mustard flour 
etc: 1,2 2,5 4,6 6,9 7,9 12,1 14,2 17,4 21,0 14,3 17,0 
2104 
Soups, broths & preps, homogenized comp food 
preps: 1,3 2,0 1,4 2,1 1,8 2,8 3,5 2,3 2,9 2,0 2,2 
2106 Food preparations nesoi: 6,1 10,0 9,7 12,0 15,8 26,5 32,6 38,4 42,1 30,0 35,3 
  Group 24                       
2401-
2403 Tobacco: 48,0 51,6 64,5 78,3 86,8 96,9 90,5 98,9 94,5 82,4 80,1 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine and State Customs Service of Ukraine 
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Annex 3. Agrofood group Commodities – Export (thousand tons) 
Code Denomination 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 Group 2  
202 Beef, frozen: 136,4 90,2 130,7 146,0 77,4 56,1 12,1 34,4 16,8 18,9 13,2 
203 Pork fresh, cooled or frozen: 10,2 1,5 1,1 12,3 7,8 6,6 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,6 
206 
Food subproducts of cattle, pigs, sheep, 
goats, horses, donkeys, mules, fresh, cooled 
or frozen: 
2,8 1,6 2,9 4,3 1,3 1,1 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 
207 
Meat and food subproducts of poultry trade 
position 0105, fresh, cooled or frozen: 
0,8 0,4 3,6 0,8 0,2 0,1 0,3 5,0 8,4 18,9 32,5 
 Group 4  
401 
Milk and cream, non-condensed without 
sugar addition  
0,4 1,0 0,3 1,4 1,7 1,9 2,8 4,2 16,4 18,2 16,3 
402 
Milk and cream, condensed or with sugar 
addition 
57,3 96,0 60,2 73,3 107,8 97,2 92,6 91,3 80,3 45,8 33,2 
403 
Buttermilk, yoghurt, kefir and others or 
acidified milk and cream 
0,0 0,3 0,0 0,2 0,6 3,1 0,8 1,1 1,3 3,0 4,6 
404 Milk serum 0,0 0,1 0,5 1,6 3,8 10,2 7,7 15,5 11,3 12,2 19,0 
405 Butter and other fats made of milk 31,3 53,5 14,9 17,7 42,3 24,4 12,7 3,9 6,1 0,9 1,2 
406 Cheeses of all types and lactic cheese 12,5 30,8 37,0 61,3 93,6 116,2 49,2 62,0 77,4 76,6 79,3 
407 Eggs of poultry in shells  0,4 0,0 0,1 0,3 0,2 1,0 1,1 15,0 10,4 35,5 20,4 
408 Eggs of poultry without shells 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,6 1,1 3,2 
409 Natural honey 0,2 1,4 3,4 3,2 4,6 3,8 6,6 3,5 3,3 7,4 7,0 
 Group 7  
701 Potatoes, fresh or cooled 0,1 0,6 0,3 0,3 1,1 0,1 0,6 2,8 2,0 3,5 7,2 
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702 Tomatos, fresh or cooled  3,4 1,0 1,0 3,4 3,0 3,8 12,3 19,9 32,4 69,4 59,1 
703 
Onion, shallot, garlic, leek and other onion 
vegetables, fresh  
0,4 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,1 6,5 66,2 2,2 68,3 1,9 
704 Cabbage, cauliflower, broccoli  0,0 0,0 0,4 0,1 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,5 2,1 2,6 9,9 
706 
Carrots, turnip, table beet, salsafy, radish, 
celery root   
0,1 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,7 0,8 4,9 2,1 
707 Cucumbers, cornichons fresh   1,2 1,1 0,4 0,6 0,5 1,1 3,8 4,5 6,2 15,4 14,5 
708 Legumes skinned or not, fresh or cooled 0,2 0,3 9,8 2,1 9,0 13,9 9,0 1,3 6,1 29,6 5,7 
709 Other vegetables, fresh or cooled 0,8 1,6 1,0 1,2 2,6 2,6 3,7 3,4 3,6 7,7 6,2 
710 Vegetables, frozen: 1,0 1,2 0,7 0,4 0,7 3,6 7,9 6,5 6,4 11,9 11,4 
713 Legumes dried 26,2 109,4 183,1 44,8 177,5 179,4 271,3 69,9 77,6 271,6 158,2 
 Group 8  
802 
Other nuts, fresh or dried, in shell or 
skinned  
3,0 4,0 9,4 9,3 14,5 18,5 18,6 18,4 31,5 39,8 39,5 
807 Melons, water melons and papaya, fresh  2,4 1,1 3,7 10,3 11,3 4,8 9,0 8,2 7,8 27,0 43,8 
808 Apples, pears and quince, fresh 0,2 0,0 0,0 9,6 1,3 20,4 6,2 25,3 20,3 59,9 99,0 
809 
Apricots, cherries and sweet cherries, 
peaches, plums and dog rose, fresh  
0,4 0,4 0,2 0,8 0,5 4,4 1,0 1,7 2,5 1,9 4,9 
810 Other fruits, fresh  6,0 3,6 5,2 3,7 3,3 2,5 1,7 0,8 1,0 0,8 1,1 
811 Fruits and nuts, raw or cooked, frozen  6,5 8,2 15,2 15,2 18,5 22,5 21,2 19,6 15,9 17,8 21,6 
813 Fruits dried  0,1 0,2 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,9 0,9 2,3 3,2 2,7 
 Group 10  
1001 Wheat and wheat mix with rye (meslin) 201,2 2852,6 8304,0 901,1 2553,9 6009,5 4671,3 1055,9 7511,3 12884 4859,6 
1002 Rye 18,4 20,4 467,7 91,9 60,5 80,5 34,5 0,0 0,1 5,7 93,3 
1003 Barley 864,7 2212,1 2836,2 1894,8 3710,4 3501,8 4569,5 2119,7 5740,5 5489,2 4785,2 
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1004 Oat 24,1 41,3 29,4 2,1 22,6 4,3 0,7 16,5 7,9 6,8 19,7 
1005 Corn 163,2 362,3 496,7 943,1 1234,2 2795,6 1682,5 954,3 2811,7 7178,6 4052,4 
1006 Rice 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,7 2,5 6,7 3,4 1,9 3,9 
1007 Sorghum grain 0,0 1,8 0,0 0,0 9,9 34,9 45,8 24,8 37,7 129,6 38,4 
1008 
Buckwheat, millet and canary grass seeds; 
other grain crops 
15,0 41,1 34,1 28,2 44,8 65,4 17,8 29,0 23,7 50,6 52,8 
 Group 12  
1201 Soja beans, milled or not 7,8 1,2 3,4 42,4 38,4 174,6 270,7 319,5 201,3 263,1 449,4 
1204 Flack seeds, milled or not  0,0 0,0 0,1 4,1 11,0 16,4 24,2 26,5 4,8 28,2 22,6 
1205 Bitter cress or rape seeds  68,6 82,9 20,6 25,5 81,1 183,4 470,7 910,0 2387,1 1856,1 1508,8 
1206 Sunflower seeds, milled or not 833,7 584,5 68,2 867,6 354,2 35,6 229,5 370,3 97,2 727,8 409,7 
1207 Other oil crops seeds and fruits 3,0 2,9 8,3 40,7 73,0 69,7 31,2 13,7 19,3 43,5 54,5 
1208 
Flour from oil crops seeds or fruits, except 
mustard flour 
370,3 244,7 0,6 3,0 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,6 0,2 0,2 8,7 
1209 Sow seeds, fruits and spores 5,8 10,0 8,9 9,0 10,5 10,0 16,0 16,5 11,0 16,0 16,9 
1211 
Plants, plant fractions, seeds and fruits used 
mainly in perfumery, medicine or as 
mosquito repellents, parasite killers etc. 
fresh or dried, in pieces or whole, 
fractioned or not, milled or not 
1,3 0,9 0,9 1,6 2,0 1,5 2,0 2,3 3,5 3,1 3,2 
 Group 15  
1507 Soja oil  1,1 1,1 0,7 4,0 2,6 7,5 6,6 9,3 9,6 38,0 46,4 
1512 Sunflower, safflower or flack oil  583,4 473,2 566,2 924,5 869,2 853,1 1628,8 1923,2 1339,6 2333,8 2701,5 
1514 Bitter cress, rape or mustard oil  4,2 11,8 6,3 0,5 5,8 22,7 9,4 19,7 35,3 4,7 0,3 
1515 Others non-volatile fats and plant oils 1,5 1,3 1,3 1,9 2,4 2,4 5,3 9,3 6,7 9,1 7,9 
1516 
Plants or animal fats and oil hydrogenyzed, 
0,1 0,7 1,4 5,6 9,5 9,1 11,0 7,2 16,7 8,5 5,8 
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interetherifized, refined or not  
1517 
Margarine; food mixtures and animal fats 
and plant oil products  
0,4 1,2 1,8 2,3 4,7 15,4 28,2 25,4 32,3 45,0 69,5 
 Group 23  
2302 
Sifting, feed flour and other waste, 
granulated or not  
161,4 200,1 182,5 132,4 323,4 344,9 217,0 271,6 378,4 346,7 307,0 
2303 
Starch production waste and similar waste, 
beet cake, cane sugar cake and other waste  
15,7 31,2 11,7 23,4 67,9 104,6 147,8 167,2 116,2 104,6 116,2 
2304 
Cattle cake and other solid waste obtained 
during soja oil extraction 
0,9 0,5 4,4 0,2 1,7 3,3 0,0 0,1 1,0 1,3 4,6 
2306 
Cattle cake and other solid waste obtained 
during plants oils and fats extraction  
301,3 424,9 633,8 924,2 1061,5 980,9 1431,8 1588,7 1354,7 2490,2 2658,7 
2308 Plant origine products and plants waste  0,1 0,3 0,1 0,0 0,0 1,8 1,3 3,1 0,9 2,6 2,0 
2309 Products used for animal feeding  20,4 29,2 43,7 48,3 53,0 34,8 21,7 37,0 35,1 6,4 8,6 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine 
 75 
 
Annex 4. Commodity structure of foreign trade in 2010 (agrofood nomenclature) 
Commodity 
code 
Title by Ukrainian Classification of 
Commodities in Foreign Trade 
Export Import 
Thousands USD Tons Share, % Thousands USD Tons Share,% 
1 Live animals 3637 606 0,0 67519 7495 1,2 
2 Meat and meat preparations 90181 46533 0,9 457987 348846 7,9 
3 Fish and fish preparations 3930 943 0,0 568563 423168 9,9 
4 Milk and milk products 648787 184309 6,5 135587 37908 2,4 
5 Other animal products 7777 5018 0,1 12181 11792 0,2 
6 Seedlings and other trees 1782 2318 0,0 73875 25789 1,3 
7 Vegetables, root crops 119213 276520 1,2 129973 214292 2,3 
8 Eatable fruits and nuts, citrus plants 208844 213577 2,1 733345 972334 12,7 
9 Coffee, tea, spices 9870 6655 0,1 234123 58002 4,1 
10 Cereals 2467064 13905363 24,9 145584 107875 2,5 
11 Flour-grinding products 80948 227907 0,8 27542 52634 0,5 
12 Oil seeds and fruits 1085659 2487842 10,9 178933 50359 3,1 
13 Varnishes, resin (pitch) 1261 421 0,0 39636 3544 0,7 
14 Plant materials 1687 6932 0,0 889 846 0,0 
15 Animal or plant fats and oils 2617318 2933715 26,4 451609 407153 7,8 
16 Preparations from meat, fish 48688 37630 0,5 100504 51870 1,7 
17 Sugar and sugar confectory 206503 225794 2,1 231454 351892 4,0 
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations 591612 203444 6,0 407375 96872 7,1 
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19 Preparations from cereals 254291 163031 2,6 125926 51166 2,2 
20 Products of fruits, vegetables processing 210389 195752 2,1 223454 152743 3,9 
21 Other mixed food- stuffs 122922 74608 1,2 466911 92531 8,1 
22 Alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages 443705 800920 4,5 270558 189905 4,7 
23 Remains and wastes 479068 3098066 4,8 208437 185487 3,6 
24 Tobacco 213898 20574 2,2 471445 80064 8,2 
  Total 9919034 25118478 100,0 5763410 3974567 100,0 
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine 
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Annex 5: Agro-climatically attainable yield for grain crops
87
 
Figure 41: Agro-climatically attainable yield for low input level
88
  rain-fed wheat (2020s) 
 
Source: GAEZ v3.0., IIASA & FAO 2010 http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at 
 
 
                                                     
87
 For GAEZ v3.0 projections climate scenario CCCma CGCM2 A2 was assumed 
88
 Under the low input, traditional management assumption, the farming system is largely subsistence based and not necessarily market oriented. Production is based on the use of 
traditional cultivars (if improved cultivars are used, they are treated in the same way as local cultivars), labor intensive techniques, and no application of nutrients, no use of chemicals 
for pest and disease control and minimum conservation measures. 
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Figure 42: Agro-climatically attainable yield for high input level
89
  rain-fed wheat (2020s) 
 
Source: GAEZ v3.0., IIASA & FAO 2010 http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at 
 
 
 
                                                     
89
 Under the high input, advanced management assumption, the farming system is mainly market oriented. Commercial production is a management objective. Production is based 
on improved high yielding varieties, is fully mechanized with low labor intensity and uses optimum applications of nutrients and chemical pest, disease and weed control. 
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Figure 43: Agro-climatically attainable yield for low input level rain fed maize (2020s) 
 
Source: GAEZ v3.0., IIASA & FAO 2010 http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at 
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Figure 44: Agro-climatically attainable yield for high input level rain-fed maize (2020s) 
 
Source: GAEZ v3.0., IIASA & FAO 2010 http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at 
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Figure 45: Agro-climatically attainable yield for low input level rain fed barley (2020s) 
 
Source: GAEZ v3.0., IIASA & FAO 2010 http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at 
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 Figure 46: Agro-climatically attainable yield for high input level rain-fed barley (2020s) 
 
Source: GAEZ v3.0., IIASA & FAO 2010 http://www.gaez.iiasa.ac.at 
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Annex 6. Main export destinations for grain 
 
Figure: Wheat Exports by Destination in 2009   
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Annex 7: Grain ex work prices and rail transportation costs from the Western Region of Ukraine 
3.class wheat corn sunflower rapseed Batevo Gr. Mostiska Gr. Odessa port Batevo Gr. Mostiska Gr. Odessa port
Vinnitsa 213.75             185.25      403.75            408.50    -  -  -  -  -  -
Volyn 185.25             152.00      399.00            418.00    -  -  -  -  -  -
Zhitomir 198.55             166.25      394.25            -           640 km 465 km 503 km 17 EUR/t 14 EUR/t 15 EUR/t
L'vov 190.00             156.75      399.00            427.50   260 km 66 km 795 km  9  EUR/t  6 EUR/t 18 EUR/t
Rovno 193.80             171.00      389.50            422.75   210 km 97 km 828 km 13 EUR/t 10 EUR/t 17 EUR/t
Ternopol 194.75             159.60      389.50            418.00   344 km 197 km 668 km 12 EUR/t 8 EUR/t 16 EUR/t
Khmelnitskij 196.65             161.50      394.25            427.50    -  -  -  -  -  -
Distance  Freight rate Region EXW Price EUR / t
 
Source: Schenker International Forwarding and Logistics Co.Ltd. (calculated based on data collected by Ukrainian Agribusiness Club 2012) 90 
 
                                                     
90
 With the permission of DB Schenker RLF 
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